

Determinants of Police Department Change:
An Institutional Theory Approach

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Abstract

This research examines the change in police practices after the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014. Immediately after his death and throughout the following years, police departments in St. Louis County faced immense pressure to change. The pressure originated from numerous fronts, including the media, local community groups, and politicians. This research evaluates the change in policing using institutional theory with data from surveys and interviews of police chiefs. The findings indicate changes in policies after 2014. The most significant change occurred in departments strongly influenced by the mimetic dimension of institutional theory. The research adds to the literature by demonstrating the use of institutional theory to predict organizational change.

Acknowledgments

In late August of 2014, I attended my first class toward completing a Ph.D. I was worried about making it to class that night because I was working that evening and had to request permission to miss a few hours of work. The work I was missing was as a sergeant for the St. Louis County Police Department during the civil unrest in Ferguson, MO, after Michael Brown's death. As the summer of 2014 closed and the winter set in, those events set the stage for the questions I have attempted to answer with this research. As a former practitioner and someone who genuinely cares about making policing better for all of society, I hope this research offers some progress towards that end.

Countless individuals have supported me through this research and my academic journey. It would be impossible to remember and thank everyone properly, but they were critical to my success regardless. This group includes my colleagues, friends, family, professors, and fellow students. They all provided the encouragement I needed to stay the course. I owe my wife, Dominique, special gratitude for always believing in me and encouraging me to follow my life-long dreams. She has always been there to fill in the confidence gaps just when I need it the most.

This project is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Dave Robertson. His teaching and scholarship were truly a gift. He will be missed.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

Policing in the United States has been plagued with strained relationships in minority communities over the last 100 years. Time after time, these strained relationships reach a tipping point where one event, sometimes routine, sparks a wave of protest and rioting. The unrest repeatedly occurred in the mid-1960s with the Watts Riots of 1965, The Newark and Detroit Riots of 1967, and the many episodes of turmoil following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968. After the tensions reached an apex in the late 1960s, calls for police reform spread throughout the country. As a result of these calls for change and reform, President Lyndon Johnson created the Kerner Commission, which authored a report suggesting many changes for policing that were implemented to varying degrees throughout the following decades.

For all the intensity recognizing the problem with policing outlined by the Kerner Commission, nothing near wholesale change occurred in the five decades after the Kerner Commission. Some would argue the patterns of police abuse continued without pause in some communities. Although the national conversation of policing changed with at least the superficial implementation of community policing, the policing structure in the United States remains relatively unchanged (Brodeur 2005). Evidence of this is the 1992 riots in Los Angeles after four LAPD officers were acquitted after the

beating of Rodney King. The King incident represented a not so uncommon event to many South Los Angeles residents.

Many residents felt the infamous video of the King incident had occurred many times before just without a video recording. A similar episode unfolded in 2014 with the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Brown was killed by Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson, after being stopped while walking in the middle of the street. Wilson confronted Brown, and the struggle that ensued ended with Brown's death. Protests from the death of Brown started in the immediate community and spread throughout the United States with calls for police reform. Perhaps even larger in scale, protests occurred in 2020 over the death of African American man, George Floyd, by a Minneapolis, Minnesota police officer. Like the Brown incident, an unarmed African American man was killed at the hands of a police officer. One key difference with the Floyd incident was that the incident was captured with a smartphone recording and several body cameras making the event even more visceral and available for public consumption.

Do these high-profile events and the resultant pressure to change alter the practices of police organizations and local policing systems in the United States? If they do change police organizations: What is the change, does it differ among departments, and what causes change? The answers to these questions could add to the literature on police reform, and more narrowly, the use of institutional theory to explain the change. Given the geographic

proximity of the over 50 police departments in the same county as the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department, the pressure for those organizations to change after 2014 was immense. Because of the focus from media and stakeholders, the speculation would be that many area departments would attempt to enact some of the reforms such as body cameras, civilian oversight, or greater transparency. This research aims to determine two things: 1) Did the police departments of St. Louis County enact change after 2014; and 2) Using institutional theory, what was the mechanism of that change?

To research these questions, I used a survey instrument to gather information on the change in police practices and through interviews with police chiefs from St. Louis County police departments. The survey instrument asked a series of questions about changes occurring in the years following the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, followed by a series of questions about professional networks and potential external influences on the department. In addition to the survey, I interviewed five police chiefs about their experiences dealing with pressure to change and their decisions about current issues in policing.

Background of Study

I worked in policing for over two decades. Starting as a patrol officer right out of college, I have experienced the best and the worst of policing. I have experienced helping domestic violence victims leave an abusive relationship and worked with other officers to return a missing dementia patient

to his family. The families in those situations never asked to be or wanted to be in those predicaments but were grateful to have the police help put them back on the right track. Those were unfortunate situations where I was glad to do my part to help people who were in need of assistance. In my view, that is policing at its best. I have also witnessed first-hand the torment that people experience from policing. I witnessed the full range of emotions of the community in 2014 after the death of Michael Brown. I saw rage, deep sadness, grieving, and overwhelming despair from the community. Some in policing are quick to dismiss those emotions as an overreaction based on misinformation. I was struck by the raw emotion of the community. If the experience of these community members was so directly influenced by what the police are doing, the policing institution has an ethical obligation to examine the practices that lead to that moment. For local police organizations to dismiss those reactions would be to not care about their legitimacy or standing in the community.

The consensus among reformers and many politicians coming out of 2014 was that policing needed an overhaul. Commissions such as the President's Task Force on 21 Century Policing, The Ferguson Commission, and others all called for changes in the policing institution. The calls for change are an important step in the right direction in the view of many community members and even some members of police departments. What is overlooked though, is how to make the change. Police departments have a reputation of being

intractable. Many reform efforts have withered over the years as the resistance to change mounts, and the inertia of the status quo regains traction.

With my experiences in policing as the background, I became interested in determining the factors that contribute to reform in police departments. If the consensus among reformers is that change is needed, the conditions making that change possible need to be clear. The research I am conducting takes advantage of the numerous police departments experiencing immense pressure to change after Ferguson. With over 50 departments in St. Louis County, there is likely to be variation in the degree to which departments implemented change. The eight years since the events in Ferguson have given local departments time to change and enact permanent reform. My research takes advantage of this moment in time when the pressure and spotlight for reform were intense and focused on a specific geographic area in the nation.

[History Repeats Itself: The history of police scandal in St. Louis County](#)

I would not be conducting this research had it not been for the encounter between Michael Brown and Ferguson Officer Darren Wilson on August 9th, 2014. The incident released a tidal wave of emotion from the residents of Ferguson and then later from the nation. The incident spurred numerous investigative reports and investigations by the Department of Justice and independent commissions. What may not be fully recognized is the vast history of scandals that plagued the police departments of St. Louis County in the decades before the Michael Brown incident. The killing of Brown was a single

event following a relatively obscure past of policing in St. Louis County that has produced several cases of malfeasance and misconduct. To be fair, most police departments have scandals given enough officers and time as an organization. The biggest police departments in the United States have endured large-scale scandals over the decades. Many of them are reformed because of the scandals and now serve as leaders in the profession. The reason for reviewing these incidents is to provide proper context for modern pressure and change. My argument is that the worst offenders within the municipal departments of St. Louis County no longer exist. The institutional pressure they faced led to their demise. Those include the now-defunct Jennings, Kinloch, and Wellston Police Departments.

According to institutional theory, organizations are influenced simultaneously by the institutional pressures of stakeholders and the technical pressures of the work (J. W. Meyer and Rowan 1977). Technical pressures can be thought of as the purely instrumental aspects of a profession. For example, reducing crime rates for the police or increasing test scores for teachers. As this section illustrates, many of these departments may have managed the technical aspects of their environment, as evidenced by the overall low crime rates in St. Louis County. Others such as Jennings, Kinloch, and Wellston Police Departments battled high crime rates and serious legitimacy problems with stakeholders over the years. It could be the combination of failures on the

technical side and institutional side that result in the death of police organizations.

I begin looking at the history of St. Louis County Police Departments with a cursory view of the founding of the County and some of its municipalities. St. Louis County was founded in 1812, nine years before Missouri was admitted into the Union. The founding of the state is known for being part of what is called the “Missouri Compromise.” The compromise allowed for slavery in Missouri but prohibited it in all territories to the north and west of Arkansas (Thomas 1911, 52). Many of the first settlers to the area were from Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee (Thomas 1911). The St. Louis area grew in the early to the middle part of the 1800s because of river trade and the growing rail industry. During the Civil War, the region became a key area of the nation with Jefferson Barracks in South St. Louis County servicing as a critical post for Union Forces.

The great divorce, as it is commonly known, between St. Louis City and St. Louis County occurred in 1875. The divorce refers to the split between the two governing bodies that allowed St. Louis City to be free of county taxes while simultaneously assuming all debt from St. Louis County and closing the borders to further expansion. The split turned St. Louis City into a political subdivision of a county and city (Thomas 1911; Rios 2016). What is now the modern-day city of Clayton, Missouri, was named the county seat of St. Louis County in 1877. Some of the first cities within St. Louis County included the

aforementioned Clayton (1877), Bridgeton (1843), Kirkwood (1853), Ferguson (1894), Florissant (1829), Maplewood (1908), University City (1906), Wellston (1909), and Webster Groves (1896). According to Thomas Field, most of these cities were destinations for the rail lines in the county (Thomas 1911).

According to Rios (2016), the development of the area through the rail system contributed to the fragmented nature of the county. The population centers were gathered near the termination of the rail lines with cemeteries and county clubs' development in the vast land between the population centers and the central city of St. Louis. Evidence of this can be seen today with the many cemeteries and country clubs found in the county just to the west of St. Louis City.

As the county continued developing into the 20th century, a unique pattern of development emerged due to various factors converging. Those factors would result in a highly fragmented local government and policing ecosystem. The Missouri laws governing annexation heavily influenced the development of St. Louis County. According to Goldberg (1985), Missouri passed legislation referred to as the Sawyer Act in 1953. The Act authorized judicial review of annexations. Before the act, cities could annex new areas by passing an ordinance and securing the vote of a majority of residents in the municipality desiring the annexation. For example, if the city of Kirkwood, MO sought to annex areas adjacent to its city, it would only take a majority vote of Kirkwood residents. With such a low barrier to annexation, it was common for

cities of St. Louis County to annex adjoining areas found to be desirable. Throughout the twentieth century, city after city in the county incorporated and then annexed surrounding areas desirable in terms of either residential population or tax revenues. The combination of ease of annexation and what many scholars believe is the motivation to secure their cities from minorities lead to the modern patchwork of cities containing over 90 municipalities (Rothstein 2017; Rios 2016; Gordon 2008; 2020). Even as the patchwork was developing, keen observers were aware of the inherent drawback to the maze of cities surrounding St. Louis City (Hannon 1955). The development of the County was haphazard with no central oversight for public services.

The patchwork of municipalities led to a patchwork of police departments. As would be expected, the local policing strength followed the maturation of local cities. As cities increased in size and population, the police departments followed suit. Table 1. shows the number of officers in municipal police departments in the 1960s. The information was obtained from the St. Louis County Police Department's historical archives.

Table 1

Municipality (2020)	Officers (~1960)	Municipality (2020)	Officers (~1960)	Municipality (2020)	Officers (~1960)
Ballwin	2	Fenton	0	Overland	21
Bella Villa	0	Ferguson	15	Pagedale	3
Bellefontaine Neighbors	7	Florissant	0	Pasadena Hills	1
Bellerive	0	Florissant	29	Pasadena Park	1
Bel-Nor	6	Frontenac	5	Pine Lawn	5
Bel-Ridge	3	Glendale	6	Richmond Heights	17
Berkeley	16	Glen Echo Park	0	Riverview	2

Beverly Hills	0	Grantwood Village	0	Rock Hill	7
Black Jack	0	Greendale	0	Shrewsbury	4
Breckenridge Hills	3	Green Park	0	St. Ann	4
Brentwood	13	Hanley Hills	0	St. John	4
Bridgeton	6	Hazelwood	5	Sunset Hills	0
Calverton Park	0	Hillsdale	0	Sycamore Hills	0
Champ	0	Huntleigh	0	Town and Country	0
Charlack	0	Jennings	18	Twin Oaks	0
Chesterfield	0	Kinloch	4	University City	50
Clarkson Valley	0	Kirkwood	38	Uplands Park	0
Clayton	34	Ladue	18	Valley Park	2
Cool Valley	2	Lakeshire	0	Velda City	0
Country Club Hills	0	Manchester	1	Velda Village Hills	0
Country Life Acres	0	Maplewood	23	Vinita Park	4
Crestwood	9	Marlborough	1	Warson Woods	3
Creve Coeur	5	Maryland Heights	0	Webster Groves	23
Crystal Lake Park	0	Moline Acres	1	Wellston	18
Dellwood	5	Normandy	3	Westwood	0
Des Peres	0	Northwoods	1	Wilbur Park	0
Edmundson	0	Norwood Court	0	Wildwood	0
Ellisville	0	Oakland	0	Winchester	0
Eureka	0	Olivette	8	Woodson Terrace	2

Many of the current municipalities had no officers sixty years ago. Those areas with no municipal policing were patrolled by the defunct St. Louis County Sheriff's Office. The Sheriff's Office became the St. Louis County Police Department in 1955 after voters decided the sheriff system for policing should be replaced with a county police department. The impetus for the new system of policing was an incident in 1953 where the County's Chief Sheriff Deputy was shot during a picnic. The investigation revealed a dispute over money and an unhealthy environment within the Sheriff's Office that was tied to political favors


(Misner 1958). Like the professional movement in all levels of government at the time, a new county police force would be formed that was apolitical and anchored in professional standards. The formation of the St. Louis County Police Department in 1955 represents perhaps the most significant event for police reform in St. Louis County. The department to this day provides many services for municipal police departments in St. Louis County.

With the municipal departments forming and developing at different times, citizens of St. Louis County experienced varying styles and quality of law enforcement. This is still occurring today, with some cities having accredited departments following modern practices and others offering little more than essential services of answering calls and conducting traffic stops. A look at the history of the municipal departments in St. Louis County reveals that many of the issues at the center of current reform efforts have been present for decades. Since 1950, reports of brutality or scandal have been standard throughout the decades. Some of the past incidents are uncannily like modern cases of police abuse and scandal. Some of the more notable but forgotten events are documented in the following pages. I start by describing one in greater detail that is shockingly similar to 2014.

In 1962, the City of Kinloch, Missouri, was the center of civil unrest and rage from the community after a Kinloch Officer shot and killed an unarmed 20-year-old African American man, Donnell Dortch, while trying to serve a summons for a traffic violation. Kinloch, a city of 6,500 in 1962, borders

Ferguson, MO. According to newspaper reports at the time, the officer and Dortch became involved in a physical struggle and the officer shot Dortch in the chest twice. Dortch died from the gunshots a short time later at a hospital. After the death of the Dortch, Kinloch residents began protesting at the Kinloch City Hall, demanding the officer's termination. During the next few days, the Kinloch Police Station would be fired upon with shotguns resulting in three officers being shot and eight buildings being burned (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1962a; St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1962b). The St. Louis County Police Department was called to handle the civil unrest and investigations into the arsons. Figure 1 shows a map of the Ferguson and Kinloch for perspective on the proximity of the 1962 incident to the 2014 incident.

Figure 1



A report by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Stradtfield 1962) article documented the frustration of young men in the small city after the event. The youth of the city had little opportunity for education and jobs and believed that the Kinloch Police Department was incompetent. Sadly, these are the same themes expressed by the residents of Ferguson after the killing of Michael Brown in 2014. The African American residents of Ferguson had poor housing and few job opportunities in the area, with many nearby businesses being fast


food or retail. In contrast, the western side of Ferguson, with a primarily white population had been the recipient of economic development and encouraging renewal. The similarities between the same area in St. Louis County over 50 years are striking.

The list on the pages that follow provides a summary of police abuse or scandal incidents from St. Louis County municipalities. Area newspapers documented these incidents at the time of the occurrence:

- 1956: A Kirkwood Police Officer was alleged to have abused two 16-year-old burglary suspects. An officer was later fired in connection with the incident (St. Louis Globe Democrat 1956)
- 1969: An East St. Louis man alleged that four Jennings Police Officers beat him and threatened to shoot him after being detained as a suspect in a robbery (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1969a)
- 1969: The Breckenridge Hills Police Department was named the department receiving the most brutality complaints in a study done by an intern at the St. Louis County Jail. Of the 24 complaints received during the study, 11 originated with Breckenridge Hills (Calkins 1969)
- 1969: The Hillsdale Police Department was alleged to have beaten a juvenile after a traffic stop (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1969b)

- 1970: The former police chief of Jennings, MO, was indicted on charges of oppression after allegedly exchanging sexual relations with a female prisoner for lifting court costs (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1970)
- 1977: The St. Louis County Police assigned officers to investigate a series of allegations of the Maplewood Police Department beating suspects. The investigation was motivated by the shooting death of a mentally disabled man, Thomas Brown, inside the Maplewood Police Department (Wagman and Freivogel 1977b). According to Freivogel (n.d.), the officer who shot the man pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The investigation revealed that some Maplewood officers would play “Russian roulette” with suspects to coerce confessions, which may have killed Brown. Figure 2 is a photo from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch showing Brown’s mother protesting outside the St. Louis County Police Headquarters. The investigation into the one incident led to more revelations about poor hiring practices and other abuses (Wagman and Freivogel 1977a)

Figure 2



- 1982: A community organization picketed the Berkeley Police Department over the alleged beatings of several people in recent months by the Jennings and St. Louis Police Departments (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1982)
- 1983: A man filed suit against a Pagedale officer who allegedly severely beat the man at the police station with a blackjack (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1983)
- 1985: A Vinta Park Officer was accused of abusing a 14-year-old boy by throwing him down on the pavement, twisting his arm, and shoving his face into the ground (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1985)

- 1989: The NAACP raised awareness of increased complaints of police brutality within St. Louis County. In particular, the organization highlighted the Jennings Police Department as being named in numerous complaints (Dine 1989)
- 1991: Community members complained that the Jennings, MO Police Department was coercing suspects to sign over ownership of their automobiles in exchange for being released from jail. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported that one of the cars became a daily driver for the mayor (Poor and Rose 1991)
- 1993: Approximately 60 residents from Flordell Hills and Jennings, MO marched in front of the Jennings Police Department after a Jennings police officer arrested a man for refusing to leave his front yard when his son was questioned by the officer (Nower 1993a)
- 1993: Approximately 30 residents protested the Country Club Hills Police after one of their officers stopped a 16-year-old driving a BMW and then impounded the car under the belief that it was stolen. The owners produced ample evidence that the vehicle was rightfully owned, yet the police refused to return it (Nower 1993b)
- 1994: The Jennings, MO Police Department undergoes sensitivity and cultural awareness training due to an agreement with a

community group. The United States Department of Justice played a role in mediating the deal that stemmed from an allegation of brutality and a perception among residents that the Jennings Police Department was insensitive (Kravetz 1994)

- 1995: The Missouri State Auditor found that 13 municipalities in St. Louis County needed to improve their record-keeping and accounting methods for fines and fees imposed by their respective court's (Nower 1995)
- 2000: A man arrested by the Florissant Police Department alleged in Federal Court that a Florissant Officer beat him while two other officers watched. Two of the officers resigned due to the incident (Shinkle 2002)

These events of police misconduct demonstrate two things about the municipal police departments of St. Louis County. The first is that most of these departments can survive a scandal. The only departments no longer existing are the Jennings Police Department, the Kinloch Police Department, and the Uplands Park Police Department. These cities now receive policing services from the St. Louis County Police Department. One could infer that the respective departments were able to correct course and maintain enough legitimacy with sovereigns to continue operating as a police department despite the scandal. The second observation about the departments involved in the misconduct is that the more affluent communities of St. Louis County are

absent. The more affluent communities can pay higher salaries which should lead to better quality officers and more funding for training. The same communities may have community members who possess more power and influence, leading to greater oversight of the police department. These two observations may provide insight into why specific departments may enact more reform after a high-profile incident such as the death of Michael Brown and the resulting negative publicity for the region. The more affluent communities are better positioned to make changes immediately through funding and oversight. For example, the reform efforts of Better Together in the region have focused on eliminating many police departments or at least decreasing their role in law enforcement (Better Together St. Louis 2015). Part of the reason for this is the inefficiency and lack of cooperation between departments.

Significance of the Study

Although large segments of the American public support the police, recent polling indicates that many minorities still hold negative views (Fingerhut 2017). The events of 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri, and other cities across the country brought about a renewed awareness of policing in America and the struggle for legitimacy in minority communities. The message from the Ferguson protests and the continued message over the last seven years is that the policing institution in America has a legitimacy problem in minority communities. Despite reform efforts of the past decades, the rift between minority communities and

the police still exists today. Many of the issues highlighted in the last several years of protest are remarkably similar, if not the same, as the problems from the 1960s. In 2020, the nation experienced the reaction of a country after the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota. A Minneapolis officer killed Floyd, an African American man, as several other officers stood by and watched. The incident put a sharper point on how such tactics could be used while other officers stood by watching. The incident seems to have brought about more questions concerning officers' latitude when interacting with citizens.

Most of the research on policing (Goldstein, Sances and You 2017) has focused on officers' behavior with little connection to their organization. My research could add to the literature on how police organizations change and what facilitates or impedes that change. Rather than focusing on the individual officers, I focus on the organization for the level of analysis. As other research has pointed out, perhaps the role of the police department in shaping officer behavior has been neglected (Harvey and Mungan 2019). To focus only on the officer is to remain in the "rotten apple" paradigm, which holds that only a few or a small number of officers cause dysfunction within organizations like a rotting apple in a barrel spoiling the entire barrel. Thus far, the paradigm has had limited success in producing change. Focusing on the organization and moving out of the rotten apple paradigm could impact a greater number of communities.

Reforming police departments is critical to maintaining organizational legitimacy with the communities served. Without organizational legitimacy and trust, police departments and individual officers will have a harder time fulfilling their critical public safety missions. Without the support and cooperation of citizens, it can be challenging for the police to know of crime in neighborhoods and then successfully prosecute individuals without citizens coming forward with information. For the citizens, if they lack the confidence that their police will do what is in their best interest, they will be reluctant to use the police when they need help. This, in turn, leads to more community and individual-based retribution and retaliation, thereby furthering the cycles of violence in communities.

From a theoretical/conceptual viewpoint, this research enhances the current knowledge of the institutional theory of change for police organizations. Police reform in the United States has been studied for more than 50 years. As stated, most of this research focuses on individual officers. In the last twenty years, a new wave of research on policing has examined the role of the police organization and outcomes for communities (Makowsky and Stratmann 2009; Matusiak 2019; Goldstein, Sances, and You 2018; Sances and You 2017; Harvey and Mungan 2019; Daleiden 2006). The renewed focus on the organization has been heightened, in part, because of the Department of Justice's Report on the Ferguson Police Department (Civil Rights Division, USDOJ 2015). The report detailed how the city of Ferguson had turned its

police department into a revenue-generating force where officers were encouraged by city leadership to write tickets and summonses, maintaining high revenue levels from fines and fees. The report made it clear that the department's motivation was not public safety. Officers were part of a more extensive money-making system. The report demonstrated how the organization plays a significant role in the decisions made by individual officers and how they use their collective discretion.

Research Paradigm

Institutional theory has its roots in sociology and views organizations as part of the broader external environment. As part of the external environment, organizations take cues from sovereigns or stakeholders as they are more commonly known, to determine what changes to enact when facing uncertain or novel situations. Using institutional theory to examine change after Ferguson could help to solidify the use of institutional theory to explain variation in police organizational behavior. The rational/technical view of police departments views them as functioning to provide public safety and reduce crime. Society has given the police the authority to use force to deprive individual rights to accomplish this goal. Viewed through the lens of institutional theory, the technical/rational view of change is limited to changes that directly enhance the ability to prosecute criminals or reduce crimes. For example, the use of surveillance cameras or simply deploying officers to an area to make arrests. As early writers of institutional theory asserted, at a certain point, the technical

advancements in a field slow and all the organizations in the field become similar in their use of the latest technology (J. W. Meyer and Rowan 1977). Once this occurs, what matters is that organizations satisfy sovereigns that the organization is doing what is accepted and expected of organizations in the field.

Institutional theory has the promise to provide a theory that can explain change and diffusion of change throughout police organizations. Institutional theory is relevant to the issues facing the St. Louis County police departments since the problems facing them after 2014 were not entirely technical problems with crime control. Some would argue that crime control techniques were overused prior to 2014 and set the stage for what unfolded in Ferguson and throughout the nation. One could view the protests of 2014 as a backlash against the crime control efforts of the preceding years. The Department of Justice Report on the Ferguson Police Department highlighted the use of enforcement-heavy tactics to address crime problems (Civil Rights Division, USDOJ 2015) in Ferguson. Similarly, but on a larger scale, the NYPD was criticized for the overuse of stop and frisk techniques during the same time. So rather than technical concerns, the problems were one of standing with the community and overall legitimacy with stakeholders. For some police agencies, the issue of legitimacy has become existential as defunding police budgets has proliferated as a means to take resources from departments and erode their significance in the community.

From an evidentiary standpoint, this research provides new evidence on police organizational change using departments under tremendous pressure to become legitimate within their environment. The study presents tangible evidence as to what works to spur change and what detracts from change. The result of the study is likely to be very important for practitioners as they seek ways to enact change in police organizations. The literature on police reform is clear that change in police organizations is complex and resistance is found at many levels (Sabet 2012; Haake, Rantatalo, and Lindberg 2017; Schafer and Varano 2017; Jacobs, van Witteloostuijn, and Christe-Zeyse 2013). This research could provide a new outlook on how to achieve change when the paradigm of changing individual officers does not meet expectations.

Organization of Dissertation

This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter one is the current chapter covering introductory matters and sets the stage for the rest of the work. Chapter two is the literature review. In Chapter Two, I review past work on several topics. Those topics include institutional theory, institutional theory applied to policing, and police reform, Chapter three discusses my research design and methods. Chapter four covers the quantitative findings from the research. Chapter five contains the qualitative findings from the interviews. Finally, in chapter six, I discuss the interpretations and implications of the research. Chapter six brings everything together, and part of the chapter draws conclusions of what Ferguson meant to policing in St. Louis County and if

policing has made progress in the years that have passed since August of 2014.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The following chapters provide the relevant literature on institutional theory, institutional theory applied to police agencies, and police reform. Each chapter informs my research regarding the status and gaps of the literature. The extant literature provides insight into why specific research methods were used and why they are appropriate for the current research endeavor. Lastly, the literature review provides valuable context for the reader for the research methods and the research findings. The context is important because this research involves a setting of governance and policing that is unique. With the substantial number of independent police departments in St. Louis County and the high-profile events over the last seven years, the research setting is rare. It deserves consideration to place the findings in their proper context.

Theoretical Foundations of Institutional Theory

For this research, I examined the foundations of institutional theory and applied it to modern police organizations. Starting with some assumptions, Brunsson (2018, 60) says Western culture historically viewed individuals as unique and distinguishable from their environment. The concept of separation from the environment is a critical distinction that plays a central role in institutional theory. Being distinct from their environment, individuals are

assumed to have rationality and ownership for their behavior and actions. The concept could also be thought of as free will where individuals are rational actors. Holding the individual responsible for their own choices and behavior is the cornerstone of western culture and Christianity, according to Brunsson. Take a moment to consider the criminal justice system in the United States. The system is built on the foundation of individual free will to make choices, and when a person chooses to break the law, that person has culpability and may face punishment for their actions. Only in exceptional cases does the culpability become eroded because of mental illness or extreme mitigating circumstances.

Following the paradigm of individuals as responsible for making rational choices, modern organizations are thought to be separate from the environment as well, with the leader at the top of the organization making rational choices about the organization's behavior. Organizations viewed in this vein are collectives pursuing specific goals and exhibiting highly formalized social structures (Scott 2003, 26). They can set objectives based on rational calculations and coordinate efforts to achieve organizational goals. This human-centered of organizations is depicted in many organizational charts, with the organization's brain represented at the top with the CEO and top management making all the critical decisions about what the organization should do and not do (Brunsson 2018, 61). The rest of the organization carries out the thoughts and intentions of the leaders just as the individual's body

carries out the commands of the rational brain. For example, the CEO sets the sales targets, the sales staff persuades customers to buy products and services, and the factory worker assembles the widgets. A clear outgrowth of the dichotomy between thought and action was the writing of Frederick Taylor, who believed that management should devise the most efficient methods to produce goods and services and the labor force should precisely carry out those plans without questioning the methods or strategy of management (Taylor 2014). Inherent in the view that organizations are separate from the environment similar to individuals, the organization makes rational decisions about the future just as individuals make rational choices about their future. Leaders of organizations make choices about their preferences for the organization's future and then make rational choices to fulfill that vision (Brunsson 2018, 64). The assumption in this view of organizational life is that the organization is independent of the environment and has the freedom to make decisions independent of the external environment. The outside environment has a minimal role in influencing those decisions.

Beginning around the time of the industrial revolution when the thinking on organizations was focused on rational decision making, early studies of organizations centered around the rise of bureaucracies as work transitioned from an agrarian society with informal groups and families performing work to formalized factory settings with rules and hierarchical structures organizing how the work was to be done. Organizations and bureaucracies as we know them

are a new development historically. Throughout the history of humanity, most organizing of humans was done at a tribal level. The pointed rationality of this new way of organizing human labor worked directly toward the organization's goals, whether that be fighting a war or producing widgets. Max Weber (2001) famously called the unbending rationality of modern bureaucracies an "iron cage" trapping modern man. The iron cage metaphor describes the constraints that modern organizations place on individuals with layers of rules and authority removing all creativity and free-thinking. All work is done in a prescribed manner where the worker has little ownership over the job and is thought of as one cog in a vast machine. The human spirit is subservient to the rationality of the rules and the authority given to the organization's offices.

During this time, the classical school of management was born (Bowditch and Buono 2005, 8). The early writers on bureaucracy, such as Max Weber, Henri Fayol, and Frederick Taylor heavily influenced the classical school of management. Citing Weber in DiMaggio and Powell (Dimaggio and Powell 1983, 147), "it is primarily the capitalist market economy that demands that the official administration of business be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with as much speed as possible. Normally, the exceptionally large, modern capitalistic enterprises are themselves unequalled models of strict bureaucratic organizations." Frederick Taylor famously studied workers' every motion to find the most efficient combination of movements to maximize productivity (Taylor 2014). Henri Fayol developed many familiar concepts in

organizational life, such as span of control and the unity of command principle asserting that employees only reports to one supervisor through a chain of command (Fayol 2013). The concepts from the pioneers of organizational studies are still alive and well in modern organizations with rigid hierarchies and exacting methods to complete the work.

I now examine closer how the rational actor model of organizational and institutional change plays out in different contexts. With the model, change should occur as a rational adaptation in a competitive selection process (Brunsson 2018, 18). For example, a profit-seeking business can quantify the enterprise's success by looking at profits or shareholder value. A lack of profit or decreased revenue in this regard signals that change or reform is needed to increase profit. Following the rational actor model of change, a business changes its operation, structure, and personnel to increase profit. Examples of this are pervasive. Companies add or remove service offerings to increase revenue and profits. Car manufacturers are illustrative of this phenomenon. Because of the popularity of Trucks SUVs, many car manufacturers have decreased their sedan offerings and increased high-end truck and SUV manufacturing to bolster profits. They do this after analyzing and calculating profits based on consumer trends and manufacturing costs. These manufacturers do not continue to make cars for nostalgia. They are driven by revenues and profits.

What about organizations that are not judged by profits and revenues?

Non-profit and government organizations are viewed in this same rational actor perspective despite having fundamentally different incentives. These organizations are undoubtedly constrained by budgets and revenues but are not typically driven to maximize the payments for the sake of profit. They are driven to achieve a mission. A school's mission is to educate students. A straightforward way to assess the success of a school is through the grades and standardized test scores of students. Entire industries are built on evaluating and improving these test scores. However, as most educators know, educating students does not occur in a vacuum. A host of socioeconomic factors play a role in student success. Wilson (2000) characterizes police departments and schools as coping organizations. He describes these organizations as ones that are unable to "observe neither the outputs nor the outcomes of their operators" (p. 168). Wilson states that coping organizations such as schools and police departments have problems defining objective outcomes for success. For example, for police departments, what level of crime is considered successful or even acceptable for a community? Indeed the total absence of crime is a success, but what about the gradients falling below that threshold. The definition of success is hard to define, considering the police do not control many of the variables involved in controlling crime levels. As Wilson states, they must cope with the situation they are given. They cannot change many of the factors driving crime, such as poverty, mental illness, or high-

volume retail centers. Their success is very dependent on the environment. It can help or hinder the organization's mission.

If Wilson is correct and the outputs and outcomes of schools and police departments are hard to assess, what influences these organizations' performance? How does the organization or society make any judgment as to whether they are performing to expectations? Suppose the primary mission of the police is to control crime and disorder, but no reliable and accurate measures of these variables exist. How does society make sense of what the police are doing? One could look at crime statistics, but these can be notoriously noisy, with many factors that are entirely outside the control of police departments. Early writers on "new institutionalism" answered this question and rejected the view that organizations are only driven by technical/rational concerns (Kraatz and Zajac 1996). Rather than being judged on a numbers-driven bottom line, organizations in social service sectors are judged on whether they satisfy sovereigns. Sovereigns are similar to stakeholders; however, these individuals or groups hold resources and grant approval or disapproval of an organization's activities. The sovereigns are essential for an organization to gain or maintain legitimacy. In the opinion of these early writers on institutionalism such as DiMaggio and Powell and Meyer and Rowan (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; J. W. Meyer and Rowan 1977), the evolution of many organizational fields had slowed, and rather than continually adapting innovations, the organizations sought legitimacy with influential

individuals and groups or sovereigns as the institutional theory literature calls them. Using a police department as an example again, consider what happens when a police chief announces a body camera program. Typically, oversight-minded sovereigns embrace such programs and provide public praise and support. The sovereigns, in this case, are city council members or local business leaders. The general public may even see the body cameras as something a modern police department should be doing. The approval and support signals to others that the organization is legitimate and doing what is appropriate for a modern police department. All of these actions are taken despite mixed evidence on the effectiveness of body cameras for reducing complaints and help with criminal prosecutions.

New institutionalism rejects the idea that organizations are separate and distinct from the environment. New institutionalism views organizations and the environment as closely connected. Rather than being a closed system, new institutionalism views organizations as open systems connected to the environment. According to Scott (2003, 28), "Organizations are open to and dependent on flows of personnel, resources, and information from the outside." The environment plays a crucial role in shaping the reality of open organizations. Rather than having a static view of reality, open organizations have a malleable idea of reality and the environment in which they operate. In this view, the organization is porous, with outside influences constantly shaping the organization. As will be explained later, police departments of the

professional era viewed themselves as insulated from society and the experts when dealing with crime. The insular worldview would cause problems for these police departments as they tried to navigate a changing world with changing outlooks on civil rights the power of the police.

Because organizations are intertwined with their environment, they must interact with that environment to secure resources. In essence, they must convince the entities with the resources they need, that they are deserving of support. The procurement of resources from the environment is a crucial component of institutional theory. These resources range from goodwill to the allocation of millions of dollars in a budget. Because organizations are an open system, the environment permeates them and becomes part of them through employees, the national and local culture, and laws.

I will now explain further how organizations and institutions signal to sovereigns that they are legitimate and modern organizations. In the case of police departments, the traditional rational and technical measures of success are typically crime rates, crime clearance, and the degree to which the police prevent disorder. If the department cannot lower crime rates or disorder, how will the police chief demonstrate to sovereigns that the police department is effective? Institutional theory posits that organizations enact rationalized myths in their work to satisfy sovereigns. A rationalized myth is a prevailing norm operating within a field of organizations that first started as an efficient, rational way of conducting business (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Over time the operating

norm becomes accepted as a best practice. In other words, the norm becomes institutionalized in the field. Other similar organizations adopt the practice to signal they are legitimate and operating as a modern organization. What started as an improvement in operations for one organization during a specific period to solve a problem may not be as effective for other organizations during different periods. Take, for example, a city experiencing an acute increase in crime. City officials and the public demand a response from the police department. What will the responses look like? How will the public know that the response is working or, better yet, satisfactory for all stakeholders? Meyer and Rowan (1991) recognized organizations are driven to incorporate practices that embody the prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work. In part, they do this to increase efficiency and effectiveness, but primarily to signal that they are using accepted practices. In other words, organizations adopt these institutionalized practices to improve their legitimacy and, thereby, survival prospects. Meyer and Rowan state, "Institutionalization involves the processes by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule like status in social thought and action." (J. Meyer and Rowan 1991). The author's further state that adopting certain principles becomes rationalized myths of how organizations should operate. For example, returning to the crime spike, a typical response to the crime spike would be focused on police patrols and increased arrests. There is evidence that this type of police activity works (Rosenfeld, Deckard, and Blackburn 2014; Ratcliffe et al. 2011; Braga and

Schnell 2013). From an institutional theory lens, the focused patrols and increased arrests are implemented because they have become a rationalized myth of how policing is to be done. Many sovereigns in the community expect the police to demonstrate these activities in response to the crime spike. Other approaches could work but may not align with what sovereigns believe is the appropriate set of behaviors.

The modern emergency 911 system provides another example of this principle. Having this system in place is universal in the United States and was a rational response to the problem of the police being able to respond rapidly to calls from citizens. The system has been a great success in the United States and can be credited with saving thousands of lives over the decades. The practice has been institutionalized to the point that most citizens would expect to call 911 wherever they are, and the police will respond quickly to help them. As Meyer and Rowan postulate, having a 911 system incorporates societally legitimated rationalized elements into formal structures, thereby maximizing legitimacy and increasing their resources and survival chances (p. 53). Imagine a police department that opted not to maintain a 911 system. The backlash from the public would be inevitable.

Organizations may implement practices and programs that are not borne purely out of a rational/technical need. They may do it primarily for legitimacy reasons. Again, the institutional theory would predict this organizational behavior. The popular Drug Abuse and Resistance Education (DARE) program

is an example of this in policing. Many school districts and parents expect those police departments to offer a DARE program even though the evidence for it's effectiveness is weak (Ennett et al. 1994; Clayton, Cattarello, and Johnstone 1996; Marquart et al. 1993). For a time, many citizens, police officials, and school administrators believed DARE was effective for reducing drug use in adolescents. While evidence against it's efficacy has eroded this belief, the prevailing logic is that the programs remain. The program has become institutionalized. Another popular program still in use today is gun buyback initiatives. These programs allow citizens to voluntarily sell their guns to police departments as a way for the citizen to generate cash and for the police department to reduce the number of firearms in the community. As with DARE, the research on these programs reducing gun violence and crime are not encouraging (Braga and Wintemute 2013). Despite the lack of evidence for effectiveness, organizations continue to use these programs and, in many cases, devote sizable resources to similar programs. The programs are popular and signal to sovereigns that an effort is being made to reduce juvenile drug use and gun violence.

Organizations can commit resources to programs not directly related to rational/technical needs through what new institutionalism calls decoupling. Rational/technical organizations strive to maintain a close relationship between the structures and activities. For most corporations, the structure is closely aligned with the technical requirements of the firm. Structures not contributing

to the bottom line are eventually cut or defunded. Corporations commonly shed work elements and employees no longer contributing to the bottom line.

Institutionalized organizations may decouple their activities from the structure of the organization rather than cut the program (J. Meyer and Rowan 1991).

They protect the technical aspects of their operations from close inspection, evaluation, and control to avoid losing legitimacy. According to Brunsson (2018, 9) organizations develop double standards. One standard the internal workings of the organization and the other for the external world. In the case of DARE and gun buyback programs, the programs are used as signals to sovereigns that the police department is doing all of the things expected of a modern police department to decrease crime and disorder. Although these programs may yield little success in terms of crime control, it is irrelevant. The programs are offering signals to sovereigns that the organization is open to reform (Brunsson 2018, 11). Decoupling allows organizations to maintain programs providing little to the rational/technical needs of the core work while providing the appropriate signal to sovereigns.

I now turn to the mechanisms for change within institutional theory.

DiMaggio and Powell wrote an article entitled, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) setting forth the principles by which institutionalized organizations change. They argued that bureaucratization in society has been achieved and that many organizations were becoming

homogenous. The article attempted to explain the convergence of organizational form in society. Over time, the technical/rational improvements become sparse, and all organizations catch up to state of the art in their respective fields. This leads to a convergence of structure and form within an organizational field. They define the organizational field as "organizations that, in aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 148).

Three mechanisms are identified for isomorphic institutional change, where organizational form converges. Those mechanisms are introduced here and referenced throughout the dissertation. The three methods identified by DiMaggio and Powell are the coercive dimension, memetic dimension, and normative dimension. I explain each in order, starting with coercive. According to DiMaggio and Powell's view, coercive forces come from the environment in the form of legal or political mandates. Examples of this are state standards in training or budgetary restraints imposed by local governments. The coercive pressures to change the organization can be quite powerful. Take, for example, a school district not maintaining state accreditation. The school district is at heightened risk to lose the support of sovereigns and then lose funding from local governments. Just recently, the idea of defunding police departments has gained traction as a reform mechanism for police departments. This may be the ultimate coercive pressure where an organization's budget is simply cut or

reduced. These coercive pressures are often applied to an entire organizational field and cause a convergence of organizational forms.

The next mechanism identified by DiMaggio and Powell is mimetic processes. These processes are common when the goal and objectives of the organizations are unclear and there is uncertainty in the environment (p. 151). In uncertain times, the leaders of organizations will seek out models for their organization. Without knowing for sure what technical solution is best, organizations look to similar ones for a path forward. This is done to solve the problem at hand and gain legitimacy for the organization. The organization facing the uncertainty can rely on the fact they did what the leader in the field did as a way to garner support from sovereigns. This is likely to occur throughout the world as organizations and governments seek ways to protect citizens from the COVID-19 pandemic while maintaining basic economic activity levels. Organizations look at what other similar organizations are doing and find models that fit best. The process of looking for models to emulate increases the likelihood that organizations in a given field begin to look similar to one another.

The final mechanism for change is normative pressure. DiMaggio and Powell contend that the pressure stems from professionalism (p. 152). Before exploring the normative mechanism, it is helpful to define professionalism because it is a crucial concept used throughout this research. According to Friedson, "The ideal-typical position of professionalism is founded on the official

belief that the knowledge and skill of a particular specialization requires a foundation in abstract concepts and formal learning and necessitates the exercise of discretion.” (2013, 32). Freidson is particularly concerned with the role of specialized knowledge and the use of discretion. In his view, professionals must have a foundation of specialized knowledge to make good choices when using discretion. Although the point may be taken as obvious, it should not be assumed that all police officers at all ranks possess the necessary specialized knowledge to properly use discretion.

Adhering to professional standards alone creates isomorphism as more organizations adopt the principles of professionalism. Most professional organizations have publications, conferences, and networking opportunities that make it more likely to share ideas and standards among organizations. It is no surprise this is the case, as that is the intent of professional bodies. DiMaggio and Powell point out that because professional affiliations can enhance the status of individuals, many leaders seek out positions on boards of professional organizations (p.153). Representing the agency on those boards reinforces the practices of that organization, thereby further spreading practices and rationalized myths to other organizations. Within policing, numerous organizations and associations exist to promote professional norms. Some of them include F.B.I. National Academy Associates, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), and locally in St. Louis, the St. Louis Area Police Chiefs

Association (SLAPCA). While their focus and composition may be different, they all promote professional norms.

To summarize institutional theory, organizations are influenced by the environments they operate. In some regards, the organization is the environment considering that it is impossible to altogether remove the influence of society's wider culture and influences. When the environment provides clear signals for performance, the rational/technical aspects of the organization are emphasized. For-profit businesses operate in such an environment where the firm's profit is a clear indicator of success or failure. Contrast this with what can be called institutional environments where the signals of performance are decoupled from the organization's operations. Take the following quote from Katz and Maguire (2020), "Even when departmental and complaint data is available, the lack of consistent reporting and measurement standards across jurisdictions make it difficult to assess law enforcement performance. Although several studies have set out to assess different performance measures, there is still no consensus on how to best measure organizational performance." The quote crystallizes the difficulty in making accurate assessments of Wilson's coping mechanisms.

As the authors state in very frank terms, judging the performance of police departments is complex. Because of this, police departments decouple the technical aspects of their operations and rely on the signals from sovereigns about performance. In some cases, all the organization can do is make a

convincing argument that they are striving to achieve the goals important to society (Brunsson 2018, 7). The idea of a lack of objective standards is problematic for many observers but is the reality of coping organizations.

According to Brunsson (2018, 10),

The fact that reform is being attempted tells the outside world that the organization is open to change and renewal. A visible willingness to change may make it easier for the organization to acquire resources and support and shield itself from criticism and external intervention. Such an interpretation helps explain why so many reforms are attempted, even though they have little effect on structures and processes, let alone on results.

[Institutional Theory Applied to Police Departments](#)

I now turn to the literature using institutional theory to describe the behavior of police departments. The literature applying institutional theory to police organizations first appeared in literature in the early 1990s with an article entitled, Institutional Perspective on Policing by Crank and Langworthy (1992). Previous research had looked at the interplay of politics and police activity (Surette 1985). Still, the Crank and Langworthy article was perhaps the first writing to explicitly use institutional theory to examine local police departments. The authors made the case that local departments are highly institutionalized using powerful myths about their activities to attain legitimacy from sovereigns. This view contrasts with a highly rational view of departments that are focused

on techniques and procedures that are narrowly defined for only crime-fighting. The article clarified the need for legitimacy and the resultant support from sovereigns. According to Crank and Langworthy, police departments engage in ceremonial processes to regain legitimacy, such as replacing a police chief during a crisis. The contribution of this article was to emphasize that police departments are always working within the context of their environment. Departments are not entirely closed to their environments. They conclude that local police departments are recognized as the natural order of things in cities are not going away (p.360). They are genuinely institutionalized organizations that survive not because they are exemplars of rational progress but because they can satisfy the needs of sovereigns who provide the critical support they need.

In the years following the Crank and Langworthy article, numerous other researchers began using institutional theory as a lens to examine the adoption of specific police practices and criminal justice reform. John Crank, the coauthor of the original 1992 article, published two other papers promulgating using institutional theory to view police departments. Crank's writings do not involve quantitative research but rather look at the ceremonial aspects of police departments' behavior, making the case that much of what they do has little impact on traditional crime-fighting and more to do with symbolism and messaging to sovereigns. For example, in his 1994 article, (Crank 1994) explained that to legitimize the adoption of community policing in the late 20th

century, police departments invoked the 18th-century myth of the local police and the watchman. The image of the local cop patrolling the beat and having an intimate relationship with the community is still used today by the police and community members alike. The cop walking the sidewalks is still romanticized even though most officers in the United States are in a patrol car for most of the day.

After the foundation-setting articles on institutional theory, other researchers began to apply case study and quantitative methods to test the theory. Marquart et al. examined drug enforcement policies in Texas during the 1980s and found that arrests remained low. Still, convictions increased to “do something” about the perceived drug problem (Marquart et al. 1993). McCorkle et al. looked at the changes in probation and parole policies over decades and found that despite external communication of change, the essential functions remained the same (McCorkle and Crank 1996). The findings support the concept of loose coupling in institutional theory, where the core function remains static and detached from close examination while outward messaging signals a change.

Starting in the 2000s, research in the field began to use institutional theory to explain the implementation of specific practices within police departments. Katz (2001) used a multi-method design to determine why police departments would form a gang unit. His findings suggest that gang units were formed primarily because of political pressure and increasing national media

coverage of gang activity. The actual presence of gang activity in the localities studied was lacking. The research supported the idea that organizations enact programs to signal they are doing what is thought of as conforming to the norms of a modern organization. In the case of gangs, having a gang unit satisfies the sovereigns that action is underway to address the gang issue even though the actual gang problem may not be severe.

Giblin (2006) examined the creation of crime analysis units using institutional theory. Giblin surveyed 160 police agencies about the creation of crime analysis units. The survey asked questions to determine if the department had mimicked other departments, whether accreditation was an influence, and if grant funding was used. All these factors could potentially impact a department starting a crime analysis unit. Giblin found that crime rates were not the determining factor in creating a crime analysis unit. Rather, accreditation from the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies or CALEA was a driving factor. Pressure from accreditation is an excellent example of normative pressure or perhaps even coercive pressure. As institutional theory would predict, departments created crime analysis units not only because of a rational/technical need but also because outside forces were applying influence to cause the change.

Renauer (2007) examined the implementation of community policing strategies in police departments using institutional theory in conjunction with how cities use urban space through growth politics. The writing did not present

data to test hypotheses but made several propositions about community policing in a municipal setting. Renauer cited Swanstrom (1985) and used the framework of exchange value versus use value to predict the implementation of community policing. In short, Renauer postulated that conservative growth politics cities that seek to lower taxes and attract investment would be less likely to engage in community policing strategies. Using community policing would decentralize power for the conservative regime. He believes the conservative regimes are more likely to use crackdowns and increased arrests to lower crimes that increase exchange value. Alternatively, Renauer theorized that liberal growth cities that value the use-value of property would focus more on community policing and the strengthening of relationships with community groups. A key takeaway from the work is that if Renauer is correct, police departments are highly influenced by the political environment. In other words, the rational/technical needs of crime-fighting may be subservient to the desires of the political sovereigns. This research is similar to the findings of Stucky (2005), who found that cities with strong mayors were more likely to be responsive to the complaints of crime issues from citizens.

The use of statistics to influence police operations seems to fit squarely within a rational/technical paradigm of managing police operations. Using statistics and crime data for these purposes was popularized by the NYPD's use of COMPSTAT in the 1990s under former NYPD Commissioner, Bill Bratton. NYPD COMPSTAT is credited with the notable decrease in crime with

New York City throughout the 1990s. COMPSTAT style programs eventually spread throughout the United States and could now be considered a standard practice in law enforcement. Willis et al. (2007) examined the use of COMPSTAT in other police organizations throughout the United States to test whether the spread of it was due to the rational/technical needs of police organizations or because of institutional influences. Following previous research, they found that institutional theory would predict the spread of COMPSTAT because of the need to satisfy powerful sovereigns (p. 154).

The researchers selected three police departments that had implemented COMPSTAT to study their theories to test the theory. They used participant observation and formal interviews to gather data. The researchers point out that according to a rational/technical approach, one would expect these police departments to experience crime increases before implementing COMPSTAT. However, this was not the case, as none of the sites had unusually high crime. All sites had been influenced to adopt COMPSTAT through either professional contacts or presentations at professional conferences. Clearly, the departments were influenced by mimetic forces. The researchers conclude that the implementation of COMPSTAT in their study sites was a combination of institutional pressure and rational/technical needs to formulate better crime control strategies.

Giblin and Burruss (2009) used secondary survey data to examine the influence of outside funding in community policing efforts. Using factor

analysis, the researchers found that funding is not as influential as other institutional pressures such as professional associations and publications. The same research team examined community policing implementation using the survey to explore the role of emulation among organizations (2014). The researchers wanted to determine the explanatory power of isomorphic processes in adopting community policing strategies (p. 332). They were particularly interested in peer emulation and how it spreads from one jurisdiction to another. Using structural equation modeling, the researchers determined that police organization were more likely to adopt community policing practices when institutional support was present. Institutional pressures, such as publications and professional organizations, had a strong effect. The researchers also found that the perception of rising crime rates also had an impact. The finding supports the assertion by Willis et al. (2007) that rational/technical considerations also play a part in conjunction with sovereign influence the decision making of police departments.

King (2014) used institutional theory to research police organizations disbanding in the 1990s. Because disbanded police organizations, by their very nature do not respond to surveys and requests for information, King interviewed key informants by phone to gather information on the institutional factors surrounding the disbanding of the police departments. King found that if the relationships with key sovereigns were strained, disbanding was more likely (p. 682). King elaborated by stating that some of the police agencies had violated

the expectations of the sovereigns by engaging in illegal behavior of various types. Interestingly, 86 percent of the agencies he studied did not even report crime statistics, and crime issues did not seem to be a factor for disbanding, leading to support for the notion that technical/rational influences were not strong.

Matusiak (2014) applied institutional theory to a sample of 446 Texas police chiefs to test the influence of institutional sovereigns. The researcher surveyed the police chiefs while they attended leadership training through a state-mandated program. The dependent variable for the research was a combination of 31 variables measuring the chiefs' perceptions of various sovereigns. Some of the sovereigns included in the study were state and federal law enforcement agencies, national media, criminal justice organizations, police unions, medical providers, elected officials, and local media. Matusiak found that just looking at the mean scores; chiefs held local criminal justice organizations as most important, followed by medical providers. To determine what predicted the views of sovereigns, the researcher used a regression model with various individual attributes of the chiefs serving as the independent variables. The regression analysis revealed that the chiefs' perspectives on elected representatives and local media were heavily influenced by education. That is, chiefs with higher educational levels placed more weight on the influence of elected officials and local media. Matusiak's

research is important because it provides insight as to why certain chiefs view certain sovereigns as more important than others.

Brisner and King (2016) used institutional theory to look at police organizations' response to the threat of disasters, accidents, and terrorism. In a post 9/11 world, it would follow that police organizations make adjustments to the organization from a rational/technical perspective to prepare and respond to future incidents. The researchers surveyed 350 local police chiefs from Texas as they attended professional leadership training. For the dependent variable, the survey asked the local police chiefs the risk posed to their agency by different threats. The independent variables used questions about sovereigns for the police chiefs. For this survey the sovereigns included federal and state law enforcement organizations, national media, local E.M.S., elected representatives, and community organizations. The researchers found that institutional sovereigns had a significant influence on agencies' assessments of threat. Institutional pressures had more of an effect on their outlook than did organizational structure or the demographics of the chiefs.

Carter (2016) used institutional theory to predict the adoption of intelligence-led policing from a sample of 254 police organizations. Carter assessed the institutional pressures on police agencies to adopt intelligence-led policing by looking at how frequently they consulted other agencies and the closeness of their relationships with other agencies. Additionally, the researcher asked questions about the consumption of professional publications

and intelligence meetings. Carter found that believing intelligence-led policing could provide crime control benefits, had the most notable impact on the adoption of intelligence-led policing. It is important to note that it was the belief that that the new strategy could impact crime would lend support to a rational/technical approach, yet the research was unclear as to where the belief originated.

Worden and Mclean (2017) examined the implementation of procedural justice in two New York State cities through the lens of institutional theory. The research found that the implementation of procedural justice practice was shallow and that although its use is promising, it becomes hard to judge the outcomes of it objectively when applied by officers in the field. From an institutional perspective, the authors found that procedural justice is loosely coupled when superimposed on the bureaucratic structures of the police departments. The use of procedural justice by officers is comparable to body cameras and other reform-oriented programs. The programs have the support of sovereigns and maintain community support for the police department but may do little to increase the technical/rational position of the department.

In the last few years (post Ferguson) other research has used institutional theory to examine how police departments implement reform and specific programs (Smith 2019; Matusiak 2019; Terpstra 2020; Cho 2017). Similar to some of the foundational studies reviewed, the institutional environment holds more influence on police chiefs and police agencies than

does the technical gains from change. However, a police department may realize both technical gains and institutional legitimacy from adopting certain practices and reforms. A good example of this is the implementation of body worn cameras. Smith (2019) examined the adoption of the cameras using secondary data and found that police departments can benefit both in terms of organizational legitimacy and increased technical effectiveness. Body cameras are a strong signal to sovereigns that a police department is serious about transparency and accountability. While the department gains the legitimacy benefits of the body camera implementation, it also gains the ability to use the footage as evidence to aid in prosecutions.

The literature on institutional theory applied to police departments provides evidence that many organizations do in fact strive to satisfy the institutional environment in which they are embedded. It appears based on the research that police departments create specialized work units and adapt specific policing practices to demonstrate to sovereigns that they are contemporary organizations implementing best practices in the field whether or not it brings technical improvements. Some of the gaps in the research include what specific professional associations influence departments and what is the thought process of organizations when they carry out reform efforts. My research attempts to shore-up some of the gaps in the research by surveying departments on what professional associations were influential and interviewing police officials about their influences and concerns when implementing specific

reform efforts. As mentioned earlier, the implication of this is that academics and practitioners can make better judgments about how to influence change within the policing profession.

Police Reform

I now turn to the extant literature on police reform. Police reform has occurred in waves throughout the last hundred plus years in the United States and has been studied extensively since the late 1960s. Much of the research was prompted by the unrest and discontent with the police during the 1960s. This period witnessed police brutality in response to the civil rights movement and Vietnam War protests. Like modern police reform movements, the grievances of the communities during these episodes were much broader than just police issues. Still, it was an interaction with police that sparked most of these incidents. According to Walker (Walker 2012), efforts to reform the police are more than a century old. Walker points out that, unfortunately, most of these reforms faded away over time. Over the years, several variants of community policing have appeared with promise only to lose popularity and eventual use. This section of the literature review provides a high-level overview of police reform in the United States. Much of the literature lacks quantitative research on extensive and comprehensive reform efforts in police departments. The lack of research is because it is rare for police departments to enact reform in a systematic manner conducive to social science research. Reform efforts are often phased in gradually over long periods, and data is not

available to researchers (Walker 2012). In the last two decades, reform efforts have become more systematic with the Department of Justice pattern and practice investigations that have definitive start dates. These investigations are discussed later in the paper.

Some of the earliest attempts to reform the police came in the twentieth century in what many scholars refer to as the professional era or reform era. The period was a reaction to the politicization of police forces in the late 1800s and early 1900s when officers were beholden to local politicians for jobs. Politicians routinely used officers to enforce laws and provide favors at the direction of local elected officials (Uchida 2005). Uchida (2005) states the local political machines in urban centers controlled all local government along with the police departments. The local political bosses hired and fired police officers, making them beholden to the local official. The initial formation of policing was overtly political and a result of America's colonial past. Americans wanted direct democracy and eschewed a central authority organizing the police (Millen 2019, pt. 1196). The result was a highly localized police force centered around local political districts. The benefit of this arrangement was that the police of that era were keenly aware of the community's desires through the lens of the local politician.

An aspect of this local political machinery is the initial formation of police forces in the United States as a way to protect the ruling class from uprisings of either enslaved people in the South or the working class in the North (Durr

2015; Turner, Giacomassi, and Vandiver 2006). Rather than viewing the police as an institution of public safety for the good of all society, police forces were a means to maintain the ruling class's power in America according to the line of thinking. Citing Millen (2019, pt. 1384), policing began as soon as there was something to protect in the form of slave patrols, watchmen, sheriffs, constables, and eventually police departments. The influence of politicians combined with a lack of professional standards resulted in blatant corruption and brutality from some of the early urban police forces in the United States.

In response to the political era's shortcomings, reform efforts focused on making policing professional by implementing civil service standards such as objective standards for employment and testing. The movement to professionalize the police occurred in stride with the more significant movement toward professionalization in all facets of government in the United States in the first half of the 20th century. Along with better hiring standards, the policing profession made efforts to insulate itself from the influence of politicians and the public. The impetus was to provide separation from the direct influence of politicians so that officers make decisions based on professional standards and norms rather than purely political motives. The overall aim of the reforms was to instill a sense of scientific management to policing that had been lacking during the political era. According to Uchida (2005), the initial iteration of reform efforts put forth by reformers was not embraced like the second round initiated by police chiefs such as August Vollmar and O.W. Wilson near the middle of the

twentieth century. The second round resulted in the adoption of formal hiring standards and rigid bureaucracy.

Around the same time as the professionalization efforts, the United States made huge technology advancements and expanded into the suburbs as the automobile and interstate highways became a mainstream staple of American society. Society was changing and so were the police. These key innovations of the twentieth century moved many officers from walking the beat to riding in a patrol car with two-way radios answering calls from citizens calling the police over the phone. The innovative technology was becoming available while the suburbs were expanding out from the central cities. It was not just that the police had the radios and patrol cars available; it was that they were now necessary to patrol the low-density suburban streets. The outgrowth of these changes was combined with a new professional ethos that was increasingly insular and focused only on enforcement. A prototype of this era was the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) under the leadership of William Parker during the 1950s and 1960s. The LAPD of this era was known for its law-and-order approach with heavy reliance on the latest technology and investigative techniques. The philosophy of the professional era and chiefs such as William Parker, was that the police are the experts focused on solving crime and enforcing the law. The public's input was not viewed as highly valued or even necessary for the effective functioning of a police department.

Departments of this ilk were internally focused with lowered emphasis on the public's views.

The detached and rigid professional era successfully removed political influence from policing but created new problems in the process. Isolation from political machines and the community may curtail favors and bribes, but it also makes police departments unresponsive and insensitive to the community's desires. Throughout the twentieth century, minority communities complained of mistreatment by police forces. Some of the mistreatment and outright brutality was in plain sight during the civil rights movement in 1963 when Bull Connor, the Birmingham, Alabama Police Commissioner, used fire hoses and police dogs on protestors led by Martin Luther King. Despite the evidence of brutality, the claims were largely ignored, and the resentment for the police departments built over time. Some of the collective grievances erupted with unrest and rioting in the late 60s, with major riots in Los Angeles, Newark, and Detroit. During the mid to late 1960s, many cities in the United States experienced rioting (Uchida 2005). During this time reformers recognized the drawbacks of the professional era and moved to reverse some of the consequences of isolating the community.

Spurred by the findings of the Kerner Commission (Kerner 1968), a study of the causes of civil unrest commissioned by President Lyndon Johnson. The Kerner Commission report acknowledged that although the riots of the late sixties were sparked by more or less routine police actions such as arrests, the

following unrest was an outpouring of grievances from the community that had built up over decades as the community endured abuses of power from the police. The findings of the Kerner Commission motivated moving toward a model of policing integrating the input of the community. The model is the basis of community policing. Some of these central tenets of community policing remain in modern police departments. Those tenets are to seek community input and feedback about police operations, partner with citizens to reduce crime, and hire officers that are representative of the community in terms of gender and race.

Adding to the landscape of reform in the 1960s were United States Supreme Court rulings that curtailed police powers. Two of those cases were *Mapp v. Ohio* in 1961 and *Miranda v. Arizona* in 1966. In *Mapp*, the Supreme Court ruled that the “exclusionary rule” barring unconstitutionally obtained evidence from being used in court applied to local officers. Before the case, the exclusionary rule only applied to federal law enforcement officers. By applying it to local officers, many believed that criminal investigations would be impeded. In *Miranda*, the Court ruled that officers must inform suspects that they have a right not to make statements to the police. The Supreme Court reasoned that a police officer or detective could easily overwhelm a citizen with a sense of having to speak with the police. The Court concluded this pressure to speak to the police must be balanced by informing citizens of their right to remain silent and counsel. At the

time, both of these cases were thought to have devastating effects on the efficacy of the police. Over time, both cases became part of the standard operating environment for the police in the United States.

Reform efforts of the last fifty years consist of themes coming mainly from the community policing era. As stated, some of those include hiring officers that are representative of the community, increasing the education levels of officers, creating civilian oversight bodies, and implementing community policing efforts. More recently, reforms have focused on adapting body cameras and technology to improve accountability. Unfortunately, many of these efforts were not institutionalized throughout all 18,000 police agencies throughout the United States. Instead, they were started and implemented to varying degrees depending on the individual departments and the state or local political context. The haphazard nature of the reforms highlights what could be considered a weakness of the American Federalism system for local policing. Without national coordination, reform efforts are challenging to achieve uniformly throughout the nation, creating pockets of innovation and stagnation.

Skogan provides an overview of the failures of police reform efforts in his 2008 article entitled, *Why Reforms Fail* (Skogan 2008). As the title foreshadows, Skogan is clear that efforts to change police departments often fall short. Take, for example, the LAPD after the Rodney King Incident in 1991. The LAPD made many changes, including hiring an African American chief from Philadelphia and adding thousands of more officers to the force. Unfortunately,

the department was again in the middle of a crisis by the late 1990s with the Rampart scandal. Officers from the Rampart CRASH Gang unit had become a rogue group of officers routinely robbing drug dealers and planting evidence to make cases. Skogan identifies numerous areas throughout a police agency where reform efforts can be stifled. Reform can be thwarted from the line officers, first-line supervision, middle management, the police union, or other factors such as more pressing problems within a department. All of this is to say that reform efforts in police organizations are a daunting task. The inertia of the historical institutional belief system is simply too much to overcome for many organizations.

Walker (2012) sees the officer subculture as a significant roadblock to implementing change. Crank (1998, 15) asserts that culture carries institutionalized values. He says, "The idea that some ways of doing things become valued in themselves means that they have become institutionalized: we do them because we share a belief that they are the right things to do." These shared beliefs can be tough to change and, in some cases, become entangled in the organization's identity as a social construct (Jacobs, van Witteloostuijn, and Christe-Zeyse 2013). Much of the literature on failed police reform focuses on the problems of entrenched culture and the command structure of police departments (Crank 1998; Armacost 2003; Chan 1996; Hassell, "Solomon" Zhao, and Maguire 2003). One should not underestimate the power of these forces when considering a change in police organizations.

As Sparrow states, “Having a strong personal commitment to the values with which they have ‘grown-up,’ police officers will find any hint of a proposed change in the police culture extremely threatening.” (1988). Whereas Skogan correctly points out that while resistance to change can occur throughout the police organization, the common thread may be the police culture.

The tradition within police organizations throughout the United States is for commissioned officers to start at the rank of patrol officer and then move progressively to more prestigious roles such as detective, sergeant, and then the management ranks. The average police chief in a U.S. agency has risen through the ranks in a police organization over a career. The result of this system is a firm adherence to police values and dispositions. As Lau points out, the problem with this arrangement is that most officers from patrol to the chief have been institutionalized to the values of the organization and the police culture (Lau 2004). Pierson (2004, 153) makes a similar point when he alludes to the idea that the actors are not making the institution; the institution is making the actors. In the case of a police organization, a chief rising through the ranks has been conditioned and prepared to maintain the institution’s culture. The profound implication of the statement is that the status quo becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The last two decades have seen a new development in police reform within the United States. Partly in response to the Rodney King incident, In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act

(42 U.S.C. § 14141) that enables the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate and sue police departments to enact reforms (Harmon 2017). These investigations are referred to as pattern and practice investigations. The investigations have been used extensively over the last two and a half decades to initiate reform in police departments. Since the inception of the legislative authority, more than 25 departments received Department of Justice intervention (Police Executive Research Forum 2013). Most federal investigations review practices dealing with use of force, investigations, early intervention systems, and bias-based policing. Many departments voluntarily submit to a consent decree after the investigation to avoid litigation by the Department of Justice. For example, the Department of Justice investigated the Ferguson, MO Police Department following the death of Michael Brown in 2014. In 2016, the Ferguson City Council accepted the conditions of the decree rather than face litigation from the Department of Justice (Wagner, Laura 2016). Once a police department agrees with the terms of the decree, the department is mandated to enact reforms that are evaluated and monitored by a federal judge.

The pattern and practice investigations are initiated to investigate systemic misconduct from police agencies (Police Executive Research Forum 2013). Some examples include pattern and practice investigations of well-known departments such as the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The LAPD was investigated after what is known as the Rampart Scandal in the late

1990s, where an officer of the Rampart CRASH gang unit were found to be routinely planting evidence on suspects, using excessive force, making false arrests, and even committing robberies (Domanick 2015). In 2000, the Los Angeles City Council agreed to accept the consent decree. The decree ultimately paved the way for famed NYPD police commissioner, Bill Bratton, to become the police chief of the LAPD and implement what appears to be lasting reform for the LAPD. Another example of a consent decree that arguably did not have the success of the LAPD decree is from Oakland, California. Oakland has been under a consent decree since 2003 and has gone through numerous chiefs under the decree. The Oakland police have failed to be scandal-free for any significant amount of time since under decree. Oakland serves as an unfortunate example of how intractable the police department can be when facing change.

Many of the consent decrees last for years, some stretching over a decade, costing the city millions of dollars to enact the changes. Consent decrees as a method to reform police departments in the United States highlight the immense difficulty when trying to change decades of custom and culture in police departments. The successfully reformed department can be an example for other jurisdictions needing reform. To date, little academic research has been conducted on the effectiveness of consent decrees to enact lasting reform (Walker 2012). Some researchers point out that the data from the federal

interventions are hard to access, thus making research difficult (Alpert, McLean, and Wolfe 2017).

Reforming the police has been a long-standing practice in the United States. It started as a way to break from the overt political nature of policing in the late 19th century and has continued until today with attempts to integrate the police with the communities they serve. The discourse over police reform occurs at all levels of government, from city councils to the President of the United States. The implementation of reform has occurred slowly and piecemeal, with efforts being implemented in local departments with little systematic oversight from state and federal agencies. Because of the incongruence of efforts, studying the reform efforts for policing as a whole is difficult. The goals of this research should add to the literature on what factors lead to reform and how the reform is implemented on a local level.

Hypotheses

I have derived several hypotheses from the literature review to test the degree and nature of change within St. Louis County municipal police departments. Using a survey instrument described in the next chapter, I explore different dimensions of institutional theory that may help explain why some departments change more than others. The hypotheses are guided by and tied back to the dimensions of institutional theory. The hypotheses are as follows:

1. Departments with greater normative influence will enact more change.

2. Departments with greater mimetic influence will enact more change.
3. Departments with greater coercive influence will enact more change.

Hypothesis one is derived from the normative dimension of institutional theory. The dimension is concerned with the influence of professional norms and acceptable conduct in a given occupation. Departments influenced more by professional organizations such as SLAPCA, PERF, FBINA, and NOBLE are more likely to enact change because those organizations are considered thought leaders at the local and national levels. The professional organizations mentioned embody modern professional norms for police departments. If departments consider themselves professional, they are influenced by what these organizations view as professional and should enact progressive change.

Mimetic influence is copying or emulating other departments. Recall that this comes from situations with no clear precedent for organizational action. In those cases, the rational choice for action is not clear, and organizations look to other organizations for cues and direction on the best option. Faced with the uncertain situation post-Ferguson, one could expect that departments with strong mimetic influence would enact more change. The demands on local departments in 2014 were extreme because of intense scrutiny and its amplification through social media. Based on the history of policing in St. Louis County, pressure such as this had never been experienced before.

Within the paradigm of institutional theory, the coercive dimension is when an organization is pressured to act because a body or office with authority is

threatening some official action against the organization. This could be a city council cutting funding from a budget or an accreditation agency stripping accreditation. For local police departments, many coercive pressures could exist. Recent efforts to defund the police in some jurisdictions are a clear example of coercive force or at least rhetoric. One would expect that if coercive pressure was applied to a department either from elected officials, the federal government, or unions, the department would enact more change. Hypothesis three tests this dimension of institutional theory.

Chapter 3: Research Methods

Introduction

This research aims to use institutional theory to explain reform by police departments in St. Louis County after the events in Ferguson. The death of Michael Brown and the following protests and responses to protest should be considered a focusing event (Birkland 2011). Focusing events draw attention to a situation or issue that was not widely known as a problem. The death of Michael Brown is a focusing event that brought hyper-scrutiny to the policing practices in St. Louis County. The event itself and the protests over the following weeks drew in national and international media attention. Throughout the late summer and fall of 2014, St. Louis County policing practices stayed in the media spotlight. Even years after the initial event, the scrutiny continued as local St. Louis events such as the Jason Stockley verdict and national events such as the killing of George Floyd in May of 2020 stirred new emotion and rekindled criticisms. If police departments are open to their environments to any degree, one would theorize change would occur given the pressures applied in 2014 and beyond. The pressure could originate in several places such as coercive pressure from sovereigns or normative and mimetic pressure from peers and professional groups. The assertions thus far are straightforward and intuitive. A set of deeper questions remain about what police departments within St. Louis County changed and what specific factors brought about that change. It is unlikely that the shift was uniform across all departments. I theorize that police departments in St. Louis County should have been

incentivized by environmental pressures to change their respective organizations. I predict that pressure from sovereigns will induce departments to make reform changes. To make such a prediction is not necessarily bold or cutting edge. It is more important to explain how the change occurs and why some departments embrace the change while others seem more apt to continue with the status quo. This chapter discusses the research design and rationale, methods, and ethical concerns for the researcher.

Research Design and Rationale

The primary instrument to answer the research questions is a survey administered to police departments in St. Louis County. The first part of the survey is comprised of items assessing the degree to which police departments in St. Louis County answered calls for reform. The answers to these questions serve as the dependent variable in the study. The second half of the survey asks questions about the influences upon the police department. These questions examine the role of sovereigns or stakeholders and professional norms for the police departments and the possibility of influencing the department to make changes.

The overall rationale for the design is that research needs to be conducted on the change in police practices in St. Louis County after 2014. With all the attention on the Ferguson Police Department and its court system in the media and elsewhere throughout the nation. A fundamental question is whether policies and practices were changed or revised in other nearby

departments to reflect reformers' desire. Did all the effort make a difference? A second question to answer is *how* departments changed operations after Ferguson. How were the changes implemented? Did the mindset and posture toward the administration of justice change, or were the differences only symbolic? Of course, there are many ways that a researcher could potentially examine this issue. Still, I believe a practical way to assess the departments is by asking departments directly about their formal policies and procedures. As a researcher and practitioner in the field, I am aware that the formal policies and procedures could differ from practices, but that would require different methods to be employed and is beyond the scope of this research. In sum, these research methods provide an accessible and practical way to judge the change in departments after 2014.

Along with surveys, I assess change in St. Louis County police departments through interviews with police chiefs. The interviews are voluntary and solicited through the survey. The interviews provide greater context for the changes during the study period. The interviews have a standard set of questions designed to elicit responses and reactions to changes since 2014. It is one thing to know a policy changed and another to know the motivation and story behind the change. The interviews provide an opportunity for those willing to tell their story behind the change. The interviews were conducted over video conference or phone call for convenience and COVID-19 protocols.

Role of the Researcher

As the researcher, I created the survey instrument, administered the survey, and interviewed the police chiefs. As a practitioner in the field for 20 years, I have a vast degree of knowledge and insight into police practices other researchers may lack. I have worked at numerous levels within a large police department, been a trainer at a police academy, and a CALEA accreditation manager. Within these positions, I have had the privilege of working on numerous projects that involve examining current policing practices and improving methods. For example, I participated in seminars with the Center for Policing Equity and collaborated with the Policing Project at NYU. These experiences give me the context for the information obtained during the research. The downside to this experience in the field is that I may lack objectivity when looking at some policies compared to a researcher with no prior policing expertise. On balance I am confident that my experience in the policing field allows me to understand the intricacies of the issues faced by police departments and provide a fair and accurate portrayal of their respective responses to calls for reform.

Methodological Approach

Department Selection

The departments selected for this study are the police departments in St. Louis County. When the survey was distributed, there were 53 departments within the county, but that number fluctuates as small departments fold and

contract with other departments for service (Karr 2016). Nearly all these departments are under 100 officers, with only three over 100. The biggest department, the St. Louis County Police Department, was not included in the research because of its large size (nearly 1,000 officers) relative to the other departments. Two other departments of over 100 officers were included in the survey. By limiting the size of the departments, most departments have similar operating and management issues.

The intent was to have as many departments as possible participate in the study. The availability of data on the departments varies widely. Some departments list the name and phone number of the police chief on the department website. I called some of those chiefs, and they answered the call themselves. That type of accessibility should be applauded. On the other end of the spectrum, some departments had basic websites that provided no working numbers or a simple method to contact anyone from the department. Knowing that accessibility was a challenge and to promote full participation in the study, I advertised the research to the St. Louis Area Police Chiefs Association and encouraged participation. Along with promoting the survey at the meetings, I called and emailed numerous chiefs soliciting their participation. Many departments did not respond to the emails and phone calls, but others immediately completed the survey once prompted.

For the interviews of police officials about reform, I asked a question on the survey about participating in an interview. Once those chiefs were

identified, I reached out to them personally and conducted the interviews using the Zoom video conferencing platform for four interviews and a phone call for one. The interviews were not recorded but memorialized with notetaking. I conducted five interviews which are discussed in a later chapter.

Survey Instrument

The survey asked a series of questions to serve as the basis for the independent and dependent variables. For the dependent variable, questions were asked about changes to policies and practices and the time frame. The items were scored to create a composite score for each department. I used two primary sources to create the survey items assessing change in policing practices. The first source came from consolidating the calls for change by activists, academics, experts, and government bodies after the events in Ferguson. Fortunately, these calls for change have been researched and memorialized by the Ferguson Commission's *Forward through Ferguson: A Path Toward Racial Equity* (Ferguson Commission 2015) and The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 2015). The calls for action in both reports cover a wide range of urban issues, including police-community relations, police responded to the protest, education, police training, transportation, and racial equity. I selected the calls for action relevant to local police departments from the two reports and formulated questions assessing the reform efforts of local police departments in St. Louis County. Along with the calls for change from the two extant reports, I

also included items on the survey from my professional experience that assesses the degree to which local departments are implementing the latest in progressive police practices. Some of these practices are only found in very progressive police departments. For example, the survey contains a question asking if a written waiver is required for consent searches. Such policies are rare to find in police department policies. Asking about the use of such a policy would indicate a strong willingness to change.

The items assessing the change in policing practices are shown in Table 2. The respondent has three response options for the initial question. Those options are “Yes,” “Planning on implementing,” and “No.” If the answer is yes, the survey branched to another question asking what year the policy was implemented. The options for those questions were “2013 or earlier,” “2014-2019,” and “2020”. The answers to each question were assigned points to create a composite score representing the dependent variable. Each department was scored according to the following scale: One point if the department already implemented the action, a half-point if the department plans to implement the action or is in the process, and zero points if the department has not implemented the action. For the timing of the implementation, the following scale was used: One point for 2020, two points for 2014-2019, and three points for 2013 or earlier.

Table 2. Dependent Variable Questions

Question	Possible Responses		
Does your department have a body camera program?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department use social media for community engagement?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department post policies and procedures online?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department post crime stats online?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department publish statistics online about use of force incidents?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Is your department mandating procedural justice training for officers?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Is your department mandating de-escalation training for officers (Does not include the mandate by the State of Missouri from October 2020)?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department mandate wellness training for officers?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department have a program focused on officer-youth interaction within the community other than D.A.R.E. and S.R.O.s?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department have an officer wellness program (a program for ensuring the mental, emotional, and physical health of employees) with at least one dedicated employee to run the program?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department have programs to provide alternatives to arrest or other diversion programs (e.g., C.I.T)?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No

Does your department have search and seizure procedures related to L.G.B.T.Q. and transgender citizens?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department have a citizen advisory board for input on policies and oversight? For example, a board specifically to advise on community relations, but not for oversight of complaints.	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department have a civilian review board? For example, a board that is responsible for reviewing complaints on officers and the discipline of department employees.	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department have policies, procedures, or formal plan to recruit more applicants that are representative of the community in terms of race, ethnicity, or gender?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department participate in a national database tracking use of force (e.g., F.B.I., Center for Policing Equity)?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department report a display of a firearm as a use of force?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department collect data on pedestrian stops other than regular call for service information? For example, collecting the perceived race and age of a citizen and whether a search was conducted.	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department have an early warning system to detect patterns of misconduct or problematic behavior in officers?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department require written waivers for all consent searches?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No
Does your department prohibit the use of misdemeanor "warrants" (e.g., entering an arrest teletype based on only an officer's authority)?	Yes	Planning on implementing	No

The answers to each item were assigned points to create a composite score representing the dependent variable. Scoring the departments in this way provides a single score representing the reform efforts of each department. The score assesses the amount and timing of the reform. Rather than just asking if a policy or practice was implemented, adding the time frame provides

a dimension of timing to the reform efforts. Earlier reform efforts are more impactful than current or impending efforts. The score for a department equals the status of the policy (Yes, Planning on implementing and No) plus the timing (2013 or earlier, 2014-2019, and 2020), summed across all items in the survey. A body camera implementation can serve as an example. If a department has no body cameras, they receive zero points. The calculation and rationale are straightforward; they have not implemented any reform in this regard. Another example would be a department that implemented body cameras before 2013. In this case, the department receives 4 points toward the final score. One point for the policy and three points for the timing. The same process is used for all items in the survey and summed to create a single score for each department.

The independent variables comprise a combination of responses from the survey similar to the dependent variable. A section of the survey asked the respondent about influences on the department. The questions were constructed with Likert scale responses and sought to determine the degree to which each influence from institutional theory impacted the respective departments. For example, a set of questions asked about the influence of specific professional organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Academy, while others asked whether the department was influenced by specific community organizations or elected officials. The Likert scale was formatted on a 5-point scale with the following response options: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, Strongly

Disagree. The responses were then transformed to a numerical score of 5 to 1, following the same direction as the text responses. The items assessing the independent variable were summed for each category representing the dimension of institutional theory they were gauging. For example, three items from the survey theoretically represented the mimetic dimension of institutional theory. The items in the mimetic group were summed to give a score for that dimension. For example, a department answering the three items for the mimetic dimension with a score of three would have a score of nine for that dimension. Table 3 shows the questions for the independent variables.

Table 3. Items for Independent Variables

Mimetic Influence	Scale				
My department looks to other police departments near our jurisdiction for best practices.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department looks to other organizations (businesses, schools, non-profits) for best practices.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department has specific organizations to use for best practices (e.g., specific police departments used to guide policies and operations).	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Normative Influence					
My department encourages attendance at local professional association meetings (SLAPCA, FBINA, etc.).	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

My department encourages employees to obtain leadership roles within the local professional associations.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department is influenced by the Commission on the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA).	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department is influenced by the Missouri Police Chiefs' Association.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department sends employees to the Senior Management Institute of Policing (SMIP) training.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department sends employees to the FBINA training.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department sends employees to the Northwestern Police Command School.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department is influenced by the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Professionals (NOBLE).	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department is influenced by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

Pro-Reform Coercive
Influences from Sovereigns

My department regularly applies for grants from external sources.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
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My department is influenced by local elected officials to enact police reform.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department is influenced by local community groups such as churches, schools, and non-profit organizations to enact police reform.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department is influenced by local businesses to enact police reform.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
My department is influenced by state or national elected officials to enact police reform.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

Analytical Strategy

Using the reform scores as the dependent variable and the summed scores for each dimension of institutional theory, I created a regression model to predict the scores on the reform scale. The regression model tests the hypotheses discussed earlier. Using a regression model enables me to determine what factors or independent variables contribute to enacting reform within the police departments. Additionally, I was able to control for specific influences on the model using control variables.

Interviews

In conjunction with sending the survey to police officials, I interviewed the chiefs of several of the departments surveyed. The survey contained an item asking the respondents if an official from the department was willing to be interviewed. The purpose of the interviews was to give context for the answers to the survey questions. Many police officials gave insight into why they were

able to enact change or what prevented them from enacting change. I use the quotes and examples from the interviews in the body of the dissertation to add depth to the analysis and add to the understanding of the problem. The interviews were coded using NVivo software to develop themes from the interviews to add to the findings of the research. NVivo is widely used to take unstructured data in the form of transcripts or speech and perform content analysis (AlYahmady and Al Abri 2013; Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2011; Wong 2008). The interview transcripts were uploaded into the software and analyzed with queries native to NVivo and then coded with NVivo. The coding process consisted of carefully reading the text and making determinations about the theme expressed in the passage. The result of this process can be the discovery of new or unexpected findings from the data.

Chapter 4: Quantitative Results

In this chapter I discuss the quantitative results of the research. I first describe the results of the survey by looking at the characteristics of departments responding versus those not responding. I then review the survey responses making up the dependent variable of a policy reform score. The survey results comprising the independent variable are also be examined within the chapter. Finally, the regression model used to test the hypotheses is examined.

Twenty-five departments within St. Louis County responded to the survey. With 53 departments within St. Louis County, the response rate was forty-seven percent. The profile of the departments that responded was different from those that did not respond. The departments responding to the survey were on average bigger, policing more affluent communities with lower crime rates. For example, of the departments responding, the average number of officers was 39 whereas the average number of officers for non-responding departments was 23. The number of officers is often a proxy for the population of a city, and this appears to be the case as the average city population for responding cities was 15,396 and only 8,220 for non-responding cities. The average median income for the responding cities was \$85,439 while the median for the non-responding cities was \$62,866. Finally, the violent crime rate for the responding cities 3.1 per 100,000 residents while the rate for non-responding cities was 5.0. All of these differences except for the violent crime rates were

statistically significant at the .05 level using a chi-square test. Of course, these findings may warrant caution when generalizing the findings from the research.

The differences between the responding and non-responding departments created another important research question. Could a model be created to explain the differences between the responding and non-responding departments? One final difference between the responding and non-responding cities was CALEA accreditation. Of the 25 departments responding to the survey, 14 were CALEA accredited. The differences between the accreditation status of the responding and non-responding department were statistically significant at the .05 level using a chi-square test. I created a regression model testing whether CALEA accreditation predicted responses to the survey. The logic is that CALEA accreditation mandates departments to collect and disseminate information on policies, practices, and statistics on day-to-day operations. Many of the issues on the survey for this research could be easily answered if a department has achieved CALEA accreditation.


Completing the survey would be consistent with the idea of transparency and professionalism fostered by CALEA accreditation. From the perspective of institutional theory, CALEA accreditation would signal influence from normative pressure. The regression model results indicate that CALEA accredited departments were more than one and a half times more likely to respond to the survey. The results were statistically significant at the .05 alpha level. Table 4 shows the output of the regression model.

Table 4. Model Results	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Response to Survey	
CALEA	1.539** p = 0.049
Violent Crime Rate	0.001 p = 0.994
Total Officers	0.00001 p = 0.194
Median Income	0.020 p = 0.271
Constant	-2.252* p = 0.094
Observations	51
Log Likelihood	-28.156
Akaike Inf. Crit.	66.312
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Knowing that CALEA accreditation is associated with survey response, holding other variables constant, demonstrates the possible influence of the accreditation. It is unknown if those departments are conditioned by CALEA to be forthcoming with information about themselves or those departments would have promoted transparency regardless of the accreditation. Regardless, the accreditation status does have a strong relationship with survey response. Besides the obvious benefits of accreditation, these results suggest that CALEA accreditation may create conditions where departments demonstrate greater transparency and professionalism.

Looking at the descriptive results of the survey responses provides insight into the reform efforts and the influences of the departments responding to the survey. As discussed in the methods section, a composite variable that comprised all reform measures and the timing of the reform effort was created to assess the scale of progressive reform in one variable. The variable, called reform score, is a single number that represents the reform of a department with higher scores equaling greater reform. The variable is also the primary dependent variable that I am interested in modeling. For that variable and of the departments responding, the scores ranged from 31 to 61.50 with a mean score of 40.27 and a median of 39.75. Figure 3 shows a box plot of the scores. From the box plot, one can see that there are several outliers with high reform scores.

Figure 3



Looking at the descriptive statistics of the policy changes reported through the survey, it does appear that in the years following 2014, more change occurred than before 2014. For all of the items that changed, 73 percent of the change occurred after 2013. Several specific categories are notable. For the policies listed below, most of them occurred after 2013. The percentage indicates the proportion of changes taking place after 2013.

- Body cameras – 100%
- Social media use – 75%

- Posting policies online – 100%
- Posting crime statistics online – 56%
- Posting use of force statistics online – 86%
- Procedural justice training – 100%
- De-escalation training – 96%
- Wellness training – 83%
- Wellness program implementation – 86%
- LGBTQ search policy – 92%
- Advisory board – 55%
- Recruiting program implementation – 80%
- Use of Force database – 92%
- Reporting display of weapon – 56%
- Early warning system – 61%
- Misdemeanor wanted prohibition – 67%

The scores from the individual survey questions also provide a wealth of information about reform concerning specific policies. For example, 72 percent of the departments responding to the survey reported having body cameras, with nearly three quarters of those departments implementing them since 2014. The reform efforts most commonly found within the departments were the use of social media (96%), diversion programs (92%), and early warning systems (92%).

The high prevalence of social media use is not surprising given many platforms ease of use and low cost. A Facebook account is free to start and considering that the public are eager consumers of social media and little to no training is involved in using it, the widespread adoption of it could be expected. Many departments throughout the United States have their own Facebook page or participate in the NextDoor app that is focused on crime and safety issues within neighborhoods.

Diversion programs refer to policies and practices that allow certain individuals to circumvent the traditional criminal justice system. The most popular one in the St. Louis area is the Crisis Intervention Team or CIT. CIT focuses on aiding individuals experiencing a mental health crisis. Many times, the behavior of those individuals could be classified as a low-level crime such as peace disturbance or trespassing. The CIT program works by training officers to recognize individuals in a mental health crisis, de-escalate the situation, and then find assistance for the mental health issue rather than a ticket or arrest. In some cases, an individual may have to be arrested, but still have the option to have their case adjudicated in a mental health court. The program started in Memphis, TN and is now common throughout the United States in some form. The CIT program in the St. Louis region was started by the St. Louis County Police Department in 2003 and quickly spread to other county departments. The program is free for participants and therefore it is no surprise that it is so pervasive with 96 percent of responding departments

indicating they use the program. While not the topic of this research, the expansion of the CIT program could be considered an example of mimetic influence with department looking to other departments for ideas and programs.

The early warning system program that 92 percent of departments indicated they use is a program or policy that systematically identifies officers who exhibit patterns of misconduct or above average rates of using force, pursuits, or complaints. The intent of these programs is to determine which officers show patterns of unwanted behavior and then ideally, prevent tragic events such as officer involved shootings or even more mundane things like officers' acting rudely toward citizens. In the aftermath of the death of George Floyd, many questioned how Derek Chauvin could have had 19 complaints yet still worked as an officer. In theory, an early warning system could pick up on a pattern if the behavior was contemporaneous. Speaking in general terms, most early warning systems use basic logic and counts to determine if an officer is at risk for further bad behavior. For example, an officer has three complaints within a year may be flagged for review. Although the survey did not set parameters for the type of early intervention system, by definition it could be anything from a database with machine learning algorithms running on it to a paper ledger in smaller departments.

The items with the lowest implementation according to survey results were having a citizen review board (8%), posting use of force statistics online (28%), and having a wellness program (28%). These findings are not surprising

given that most of these initiatives are new and not widely adopted throughout the United States. Citizen review boards come in various configurations with most of them having a core mission of providing oversight for the behavior of officers. At the one end of the spectrum, some cities allow the review board to take complaints directly and investigate the complaints while others only passively review cases. Review boards in the traditional form are not common in the St. Louis area. While the concept is promising, the implementation of them can be burdensome with problems of scope and authority. This is reflected in the small number identified by the survey.

Posting use of force statistics online for public consumption is also a new trend in policing. Some have said that the administrative data in policing is an untapped source of information that the public is only beginning to consume (Ferguson 2017). Reporting use of force data refers to reporting the number of uses of Taser uses, firearms, or perhaps vehicle pursuits. Most departments capture and document these events in some manner whether it is in an Excel spreadsheet or popular commercial database application such as IAPro. Large departments in the United States will also publish these statistics to the public on their website. For example, the Dallas Police Department has a data rich webpage dedicated to data on officer involved shootings (<https://dallaspolice.net/ois/ois>). A serious problem with the use of force data collection and reporting is a lack of standardization. The definitions of what constitutes a “use of force” varies by department and because of this, any

comparison between departments becomes futile in many cases. The lack of comparisons is problematic for the public. Without knowing how to compare departments, it becomes hard to judge the performance of a department let alone individual officers on the department. Through professional experience, I have noted that many police leaders are reluctant to voluntarily publish online use of force statistics because of possible scrutiny. The belief is that publishing the data opens the department up to critics. For all these reasons, it is no surprise that the departments indicating they publish crime statistics online is low.

The last item that was uncommon among the responding departments was the presence of a wellness program. Just as mental health has been recognized as crucial health factor in the general population, awareness of its detrimental effects is more commonplace in policing. Although research on stress in policing and the impact it has on officers' physical health has been studied for decades, the research on policing's impact on mental health has just recently started to increase. Some departments have taken a very proactive approach to addressing the mental health of officers. Departments such as Indianapolis Police Department and the San Diego Police Department were some of the first departments to create wellness units staffed by several employees. These wellness units proactively seek out ways to improve the mental health of employees on their respective departments. The return on investment for larger departments appears favorable as these department can

influence large numbers of officers with only a few staff members dedicated to a wellness program. In contrast, smaller departments may find the investment in one officer to be a costly investment. Because most of the departments surveyed were smaller, especially in comparison to Indianapolis and San Diego, it is no surprise that wellness programs are uncommon.

The other half of the survey asked the respondents about the influence of various groups and organizations. The items were constructed to assess the dimensions of institutional theory. Recall that those dimensions are mimetic, normative, and coercive. The responses to those items serve as the independent variables for the research. The survey responses created three scores to represent each dimension of institutional theory. Table 5 shows the mean scores for each survey item organized by the dimension. The survey item with the highest mean values are local associations for the mimetic dimension, CALEA for the normative dimension, and grants for the coercive dimension. The dimension with the highest mean score overall was the mimetic dimension with a mean of 4.06. The coercive dimension had the lowest mean value at 3.11. The results for each item are shown in Table 5.

Table 5

Mean Value of Independent Variables (Range = 1-5)					
Mimetic		Normative		Coercive	
Other Depts	3.96	Leadership	4.13	Grants	3.96
Other Orgs	3.38	CALEA	4.50	Local Elected	2.83
Specific Depts	4.21	MPCA	3.96	Community Groups	3.13
		SMIP	2.67	Businesses	2.92
		FBINA	4.38	National Officials	3.21
		Northwestern	2.88	Local Enforce	3.29
		NOBLE	3.08	Labor Discretion	2.79
		PERF	3.29	Officer Enforce	3.17
		Local Associations	4.75	Labor General	2.67

Figure 4 shows the distribution for each dimension of institutional theory which serve as the independent variables for the regression model. The box plots visually show that the values for the mimetic dimension have the least variance among the variables. Table 6 shows the corresponding values from the box plot while Figure 5 shows a correlation matrix for the variables. As shown in the correlation matrix, the dimensions have little correlation.

Figure 4





Table 6

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Coercive	24	27.958	5.835	18	24.75	30.25	44
Mimetic	24	11.542	2.126	7	10.75	13	15
Normative	24	33.625	4.009	23	31.75	36.25	41

Figure 5



Hypothesis Testing

To test the hypotheses, I created a regression model using the variables from the survey results. This section discusses the models and the results. In a later chapter, I discuss the implication of the findings. All models were created using the R Programming language. The diagnostics for the models are found in Appendix B. Once again, the three hypotheses are as follows:

1. Departments with greater normative influence will enact more change.
2. Department with greater mimetic influence will enact more change.
3. Departments with greater coercive influence will enact more change.

The equation form of the model is as follows:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \beta_3 x_{3i} + \epsilon$$

The interpretation of the model is that the variation in the dependent variable is determined by the normative influence score, the mimetic influence score, the coercive influence score, and the error term. The model also included several control variables. Those control variables are: The violent crime rate, total officers on the department, and the median income of the city. The rationale for the control variables is to account for the influence of those factors in the model.

The first control variable is the violent crime rate. The crime rate was determined by gathering the 2018 Uniform Crime Statistics from the Missouri State Highway Patrol's crime data webpage. The violent crime rate is a control variable because it may impact a department's ability or desire to reform. Researchers such as Klinger (1997) postulate that elevated crime levels can alter the manner in which police departments manage work wherein they prioritize effort based on crime levels. Wilson (2000) also theorizes that "operators" in government agencies are primarily concerned with immediate environmental concerns such as caseloads or 911 calls for services. The concern with environmental factors makes it difficult for organizations to change practices or implement initiatives. For these reasons, I believe that high violent crime rates may impact the capacity for change because of the resources they demand.


The number of officers is the second control variable. The size of a department (as measured by the number of officers) could impact the ability to

enact reform. Variation in department size may alter reform efforts. For example, smaller departments may have more difficulty implementing body cameras because of the initial outlay of capital funds. Larger departments may find it harder to implement policies because of bureaucratic overhead. The variable is added to account for the influence of department size.

The median income is the final control variable. The median income of a city could influence reform efforts by having more funding for reform programs or initiatives. By adding the variables as a control, that influence can be accounted for to see a more accurate representation of the independent variables. The results of the model are shown in Table 7 and graphical representation of the model and the strength of the coefficients is shown in Figure 6.

Table 7. Model Results	
	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Reform Score
Normative Score	0.373 p = 0.286
Mimetic Score	1.477** p = 0.045
Coercive Score	0.220 p = 0.376
Violent Crime Rate	0.165 p = 0.747
Total Officers	0.174*** p = 0.008
Median Income	0.00002 p = 0.761
Constant	-4.351 p = 0.683
Observations	23
R ²	0.671
Adjusted R ²	0.548
Residual Std. Error	5.267 (df = 16)
F Statistic	5.438*** (df = 6; 16)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Figure 6



The model produced one statistically significant finding along with other findings that are consistent with the hypotheses. Those results are discussed in the following paragraphs. The adjusted R-squared for the model is .55. The model accounted for over half of the variation in the dependent variable. To test the assumptions of the model, I conducted several tests and checks using R Programming. The R package, *gvlnma*, which stands for Global Validation of Linear Model Assumptions was used to check five assumptions of the model (Peña and Slate 2006). The package iterates through the model object in R and

returns a straightforward output of whether the assumption is met or not. Table 8 shows the results of the checks.

Table 8

GVLMA Diagnostics			
Check	Value	p-value	Decision
Global Stat	5.98291	0.20043	Assumptions acceptable.
Skewness	1.30819	0.25272	Assumptions acceptable.
Kurtosis	1.08965	0.29655	Assumptions acceptable.
Link Function	3.55173	0.05948	Assumptions acceptable.
Heteroscedasticity	0.03335	0.8551	Assumptions acceptable.

The global stat checks the linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables to see if they are linear. The skewness and kurtosis check examine the normality of the distribution of residuals. The link function checks to see if the dependent variable is continuous. The heteroscedasticity check examines the error variance to determine if its random. The tables shows that the model passed all of the checks. A graphical representation of the checks is shown in Appendix B. To further check the model, I ran several more tests with other packages in R. Some of the tests were redundant to those in the gvlma battery but offered more technical details. The results of those tests were consistent with the gvlma tests and found in Appendix B.

Hypothesis one states that departments with greater normative influence will enact more change. Recall that normative pressure takes the form of pressure or influence from professional groups and peers to enact new policies.

In terms of progressive reform, many of professional groups on the national level such as PERF or CALEA promote progressive policy positions. The results from the regression model are inconclusive. The coefficient for the normative variable is 0.37. The finding is in the direction the hypothesis would predict, but not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.29. The small sample size limits the ability to detect small effects in the model.

Hypothesis two states that departments with greater mimetic influence will enact more change. Mimetic influence is manifested when a department looks to another department for guidance on how to proceed by emulating what the other departments have done. The influence can be especially prevalent during times of uncertainty or in novel situations. The hypothesis is supported from the results of the model. The mimetic influence independent variable has a coefficient of 1.48 meaning that for every one unit increase in the mimetic influence score, the reform score increases 1.48 points. The results are statistically significant at the .05 level with a p-value of 0.04.

The third hypothesis states that departments with greater coercive influence will enact more change. The coercive influence may originate from many sources and typically involves the use of formal authority to sanction or penalize a department. For example, cutting funding would be coercive pressure. Just as with hypothesis one, the results from the model are inconclusive. The coefficient for the coercive independent variable was 0.22. The results, however, were not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.38. As

with the results above, the small sample size limits the ability to detect small effects.

Chapter 5: Qualitative Results

As the last survey responses were coming in, I started interviewing police chiefs. The purpose of the interviews was to add context to the quantitative data and explore the dimensions of institutional theory with another method. A total of seven chiefs indicated they were willing to be interviewed. Five chiefs from local departments were interviewed based on their representation of different size and character of departments. All but one of the interviews were done over Zoom with the one exception done over the phone. The interviews were an hour in length. I did not record the interviews, but rather took detailed notes as the interviews transpired. All chiefs interviewed were very forthcoming and candid about their views and experiences as not only a chief, but a police professional over the years. The chiefs interviewed represented average size departments in St. Louis County. The departments represented in the interviews had an average of 47 officers with a diverse population served. Some of the Chiefs served affluent communities while others served working class and poor communities. The interviews were structured around a core set of questions with the specific topics varying depending on the issues at each department. I created the questions aimed at determining what influenced the chiefs to make change. I constructed the questions to address the dimensions of institutional theory. The following is a list of possible topics covered in each interview:

1. When do you feel the pressure to reform and change has been the greatest?
2. Was there one point that highlighted the pressure to change?
3. What are some examples of policies that you have changed in the last seven years?
4. What are some of the obstacles to making changes?
5. Were there changes that you wanted but could not enact? If so, what were the reasons for not implementing the change?
6. How did unions impact your implementation of policies?
7. What role did community groups or business groups play in enacting change?
8. If these groups did play a role in the change, what was the role? Please explain?
9. How exactly did they influence your department? Was it done in a private manner or was it public pressure? Provide examples.
10. Do you feel that the reforms desired by many groups actually help police operations? If they don't, what value do they have?
11. What role does the influence of professional organizations play in reform?
12. Do you consider these groups a resource when enacting change?
13. Do you think the protests and call for change made a difference in terms of change.

Several themes emerged from the interviews of police chiefs. The first theme was the absence of direct pressure to change from local elected officials. None of the chiefs acknowledged direct and strong pressure from mayors, city councils, city managers, or community groups. They discussed some questions from these individuals over specific policies or practices. For example, one chief was questioned by a commission on traffic stop statistics related to the race of drivers. There was no mention of recommendations or directives from the group to change practices. Another chief discussed questioning by a community group after the arrest of several juveniles at a park. The chief met with the group but did not indicate the group gave a pointed request to make changes. None of the chiefs would admit they had direct ultimatums or direction to make changes. In terms of institutional theory, there was a lack of a direct coercive dimension according to the chiefs in these interviews.

The second theme emerging from the interviews centered around indirect pressure of scrutiny of other departments. All of the chiefs were very aware of the criticisms of either Ferguson in 2014 or the Minneapolis Police in 2020. Four of the five chiefs interviewed discussed thinking through how their own department would fair if put under the same scrutiny. One of the chiefs interviewed talked about looking at specific policies that outside groups were reviewing with the Ferguson Police Department. He described efforts to make sure officer hiring was representative of the community. One area of concern about the Ferguson police department was the lack of diversity within its ranks.

He did this by working with his elected officials to change an ordinance allowing individuals to be hired without police experience. The modification of the law opened up the applicant pool for the department. He reported that minority hiring has increased since the change. Around the same time as the hiring changes, he implemented more leadership training for groups of officers that had traditionally not been promoted. Again, this was a broad effort to shore-up any weaknesses in personnel practices that would hypothetically be exposed if his department were to face the same scrutiny as the Ferguson Police Department.

The theme of using professional organizations was strong in four of the five interviews. The chiefs described using professional organizations such as SLAPCA, IACP, and the FBI NA as resources for information and policy guidance. The chiefs would use SLAPCA to inform them on local issues as one would expect and used the national organizations as a way to learn about issues throughout the nation that could impact them at some point. For example, one chief was in the process of rethinking policies on gender specific grooming standards. Traditionally, police departments have standards for hair length and jewelry among other categories based on an officer's gender. The traditional gender-based standards are being reconsidered by some departments in other parts of the country as traditional norms are changing. One chief described the professional connections he had with other chiefs from a professional organization. To him, these connections were valuable because

he could use the other chiefs as a resource for policy ideas. These chiefs spoke a lot about the effectiveness of professional organizations in promoting professional norms and values. Several of the chiefs spoke highly of CALEA accreditation processes in general. One chief stated, "Accreditation says a lot about a department." Other chiefs talked about how the accreditation process makes transparency easier and conditions the department to be open with information on their operations. Three of the chiefs had worked directly with their department's accreditation process in the past and spoke highly of the benefits of accreditation.

Another theme from the interviews was the nebulous concept of doing the "right thing". Nearly all of the chiefs spoke about making a choice because it was the right thing to do. For example, the chief making the hiring practice changes said he did it in part because it was the right thing to do. Other chiefs made similar statements. One chief described how he does not do something just because an outside group or elected official wants him to do something, he does it because it is the right thing to do. The chiefs described their decisions as not a direct result of outside pressure, but rather motivated by the sense of what was right in a given situation. The chiefs seemed to rely on an internal sense of what is right and wrong. It appears that the chiefs are taking signals from the environment and then viewing them from the lens of what is right. Based on their professional view of what is right, they make a choice.

The final theme I discerned from the interviews concerned the lack of union pressure. Police unions are often considered an obstacle to reform and thought to protect troubled officers from culpability (Greenhouse 2020; Friedersdorf 2021; 2014; Scheiber, Stockman, and Goodman 2020). Contrary to the notion of strong union pressure, these chiefs reported a minimal, yet collaborative relationship with their respective unions. Several of the chiefs worked with the collective bargaining agreements but stated that the unions were primarily interested in pay and benefits rather than day-to-day policies. One chief reported a higher frequency of policy discussions with his officers' union. He did not describe the discussions as adversarial, just more frequent and with higher engagement. That chief used the relationship as a way to gain more buy in for the policies he desired. Rather than just implementing a policy without union discussions, the chief would try to gain consensus on policies with the union even though he was under no contractual obligation to do so. He reported that doing this made the implementation of policies easier and more effective. The overall theme from the interviews was that union pressure was minimal for these departments. Of course, they are smaller than where union pressure has been reported such the NYPD and Minneapolis, MN Police Departments.

I used the NVivo software to analyze the interviews. One of the native queries in NVivo is a word frequency count. The query was the first type of analysis I ran on the transcript data to get an indication of the common words

from the transcripts. The most frequent word used was “change” with a count of 39.

Coding the transcripts with NVivo provided more insights. According to Harding, coding is a method to examine commonalities in data and to identify similarities between cases (2015). I used an apriori method of coding where I used the dimensions of institutional theory as the framework for the codes. Using the apriori codes allows me to compare the qualitative findings to the quantitative interview results. The findings from coding brought forward new perspectives that contrasted the quantitative data.

The coding results of the interviews put emphasis on the coercive dimension of institutional theory. The coercive dimension had the most coding references among the interviews with 17. The normative dimension was referenced 12 times and the mimetic dimension six times. These results are a reversal of the survey results where the mimetic dimension had the most influence. The coding results highlighted many phrases where a chief discussed either exploring changes or actually making changes because a group questioned the department or an official government entity such as a commission made an official inquiry into how the department operates. These interactions represent the coercive element of institutional theory. For example, one chief described revising a policy after a local commission made inquiries about department practices. The commission had the authority of the local

government to make suggestions for changes. The inference can be made that the commission used its official power to initiate potential changes.

Many of the chiefs interviewed acknowledged either direct or indirect scrutiny of their department by community groups or at least one elected official or government body. Many of the chiefs stated that they made changes or were exploring or enacting changes because it was the “right thing” to do. The chain of events seems more obvious when looking at the overall pattern. The departments were scrutinized or questioned by an outside group and the reaction was to explore or make changes. The reason given for making the change was that it was the right thing to do or motivated by a professional norm. I believe the notion of the right thing to do is demonstrating the normative dimension of institutional theory. A department experiences scrutiny, the chief relies on professional norms to recognize the need for change and may see other departments making changes.

Chapter 6: Discussion and Recommendations

Did the death of Michael Brown change policing in St. Louis County? If so, what were the mechanisms of change? Those are the questions I have sought to answer with this research. The evidence from this research demonstrates that within the departments responding to the survey, some progressive reform occurred. Further, the reform is associated with the mimetic dimension of institutional theory. In the following paragraphs, I review the

evidence to support my assertions and, in the process, review the research I conducted.

The results of the survey and the interviews provides evidence that many departments did change after the death of Michael Brown. Many departments made changes that could be interpreted as progressive reform in the years after 2014. Those changes include body cameras, officer wellness programs, and greater transparency for policies. Most of those changes were made after 2013. The interviews provided context for those changes by providing visibility into the decision-making process for chief of police. The interviews showed how the chiefs were open to hearing criticism and relied heavily on a sense of what was right in a given situation.

The implication of these findings is that most of the change reported occurred after the death of Michael Brown. Of course, my research does not have a control group where I can compare a region that did not have a Michael Brown incident. It seems unlikely that all these changes would have occurred at the same pace without the pressure created from the death of Michael Brown. Only one Ferguson Police Department exists. The spotlight of the media was on Ferguson for their policing practices leading up to the death of Brown and then on the St. Louis County Police Department for their handling of the investigation and protests. Despite the direct and persistent attention to those two departments, the other nearby departments took notice. The timing of the policy changes is one piece of evidence for this with the other being the

interviews with police chiefs. All of the police chiefs acknowledged the pressure and scrutiny from the Brown death. The chiefs interviewed did not dismiss the scrutiny as misguided or not relevant to them. They also acknowledged the intense scrutiny following the death of George Floyd. Instead of dismissing these incidents as someone else's problem, they internalized the scrutiny and asked hard questions of themselves. It appears that many of those chiefs and others acted upon the pressure in the environment.

The next question I posed was how that change occurred. My research used institutional theory to answer that question. If the policing institution in America exists solely to apprehend and prosecute criminals, then the concerns of transparency with policies and governance would be secondary to the technical issues of crime control. For example, why does a department have an interest in posting its policies online or hiring a police force that reflects the community if they are only worried about crime control? Of course, one could argue that online policies and a diverse force does help with crime control indirectly by increasing the trust in the police and thereby making citizens more likely to help the police. However, if the police were extraordinarily effective by technical standards, they would solve many more crimes and not need to increase trust. The reality is that the police, much like the education system, are not always perfect, far from it when faced with overwhelming demand and a lack of resources. Schools can have low reading and math scores while the police can see crime rates soar. Rather than judging the police on the crime

rates alone, the public and sovereigns look to other ways to assess the performance of police department. The technical matters of crime control are decoupled from the evaluation of the police. What matters is whether the sovereigns are satisfied so resources continue to flow.

To investigate the degree to which sovereigns influenced the departments, I used the survey results as variables in a regression model. The regression model found that departments influenced by mimetic pressure were more likely to enact change. Stated another way, departments looking to other departments for an example of action or strategy were more likely to make progressive reform. The regression model found these results to be statistically significant, thus supporting the first hypothesis.

I researched another important influence on departments to make progressive reform. Normative pressure from professional norms and explicit policy positions from professional organizations may have an impact on making change within the departments responding to the survey. The regression model included an independent variable representing normative influence. The variable was shown to have the expected relationship with the dependent variable but was not statistically significant. The results were likely impacted by the low power of the model. The interviews of the chiefs provided consistent support for normative influence. The chiefs spoke at length about doing the “right thing” when making decisions. They stated that the right thing is not necessarily what an elected official or community group wanted, but rather what

was best in their view. The chiefs also spoke at length about the role of professional organizations. The chiefs stated that they relied upon the local and national organizations to guide them on policy positions and keep them aware of trends in law enforcement.

These findings paint a picture of at least some chiefs and departments being open and receptive to the information and influence of professional organizations such as SLAPCA, PERF, and CALEA. The findings are encouraging for those outside of departments such as community members or elected officials. The takeaway would be to encourage the participation in professional organizations as a means or path to enact more reform. By participating in these organizations and information networks, the chiefs are opening their organization to the external environment rather than allowing it to become inward focused and oblivious to the changing world.

A final finding to discuss that informs the literature and the current narrative on policing in the United States is the role of unions. As stated in earlier sections of the research, unions have been identified in the research and by reformers as an impediment to holding officers accountable and challenging the status quo in policing. It is clear that in most circumstances, police unions represent the rights of the officers as their mission would dictate. My research breaks from the mainstream narrative concerning police unions. Of the departments responding to the survey, the influence of labor organization was scored as one of the least powerful sources of influences. These quantitative

findings were underscored during the interviews with the police chiefs. All of them recognized the presence of a union and even collective bargaining agreements, but not one said the unions were exerting substantial, ongoing pressure for changes or to maintain the status quo. One might argue that these findings come directly from the management side of labor relations and the chiefs downplay the importance of unions. Conversely, one could argue that the chief could just as easily argue that they are stymied by their unions and unable to carry out their agendas because of the unions. A final consideration is to recognize the relatively small size of the departments in this research and the commensurate small size of the unions. The small influence of unions in this research may be due to the unions small size and the strong influence referred to by researchers and in media accounts may come from larger, more powerful unions with memberships much greater in size.

Theoretical Implications of the Research

Institutional theory has been discussed at-length in this research. I have shown evidence of it predicting reform efforts of police departments. More influence from professional organizations and more normative influence are strong predictors of reform efforts. It is possible the theory could be used to predict the reform efforts of different police departments. Perhaps more importantly, the theory could be used to improve efforts to change police departments. Selecting chiefs with greater professional and community connections may increase reform efforts. The findings from this research would

support examining the professional and community ties for police chief candidates.

The findings from the research did not support coercive influence as driving change for progressive reform. As reported in the quantitative results section, the coercive influence independent variable was not statistically significant in the model. Adding to the lack of evidence was the interviews with the chiefs. Even when asked directly about the role of elected officials or other authority bodies, they did not acknowledge them as a factor when making decisions. As with the other findings, this research is limited to the departments responding to the surveys.

Recommendations

I now turn to recommendations. The recommendations I make here flow from the research findings within the context of two decades of professional experience in law enforcement. As a former practitioner, it is hard to remove those experiences from any interpretation of the findings. Although that may be seen as a drawback to my approach and viewpoint, it also is beneficial. Perhaps more than many industries, policing has a strong culture that can render even the best ideas ineffectual. A key to successful change is to understand the history and context of that change so that resistance can be anticipated. I have tried to be as neutral as possible with the recommendations with some of them even running contrary to the short-term interests of practitioners. The changes researched for this research are assumed to be

beneficial for the communities served and the police departments themselves. The survey looked at policies and practices that are supported by most, if not all, prominent professional policing organizations.

The first recommendation is to increase the strength and use of professional organizations. One of the primary topics discussed in this research has been the role and influence of professional organizations. The survey and the interviews both confirmed the prominence of professional organizations in local departments. The chiefs interviewed leaned upon local professional organizations and national ones for current information and guidance. The professional organizations can be different yet important in their own way. In this section I make recommendations on how to these organizations can be used to formalize professional norms and key policies.

So far in this research I have mentioned several specific professional organizations but have discussed them as a group without distinction. The primary local and national professional organizations serve distinct roles. I will start with the local organization, SLAPCA. SLAPCA serves a prominent role in the St. Louis Region by coordinating activities of law enforcement agencies within several counties and to a lesser extent providing a framework for standardizing policing practices. The group has an active membership group with regular meetings. Over the years it has played a key role in shaping standards and practices in the St. Louis region and assisted in coordinating large-scale events.

The final professional organizations are the Police Executive Research Forum or PERF, the International Association of Chiefs of Police or IACP, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Associates. All of these organizations advocate for best practices in policing. They are focused on the executive level of the organization with both producing original research and publications to guide practitioners in the field. Although the research they produce would not be considered academic in the traditional sense, they regularly work with academic experts to produce content for members. PERF publishes regular white papers on different topics in policing ranging from human trafficking to the use of police canines. IACP produces white papers as well and also produces model policies that can guide practitioners in finding the best practices. These organizations have robust web sites for members with access to content. The IACP provides a clearinghouse service for policies where members can go and search through a large database of policies contributed by members throughout the United States. The database is extremely helpful when trying to find examples of how other departments are thinking about specific issues in law enforcement.

CALEA is an accreditation body that was created in the late 1970s as a way of setting professional standards in policing. The accreditation given by CALEA is more pervasive in agencies in the south and Midwest of the United States. The accreditation has differing standards and requirements depending on the size of the agency and the chosen difficulty of standards. CALEA is

completely voluntary but serves several purposes for departments willing to invest the resources in the accreditation. CALEA has the potential to be a vehicle for standardizing policing in the United States. To some degree it has already accomplished that end. Departments achieving CALEA accreditation regardless of where they are located, share common features because of the CALEA standards. If accreditation could be incentivized more throughout the United States, greater standardization could take place.

CALEA requires a strong commitment. To be a CALEA accredited department, a department must commit to the annual fees charged by CALEA but must also put resources in place to maintain the accreditation. Depending on the size of the department, this can be whole team of individuals working to maintain CALEA compliance. CALEA accreditation requires an upfront investment from the agency. The investment gives departments many benefits beyond simply the recognition of accreditation. The process of CALEA accreditation is where most of the benefit is gained. Complying with the CALEA standards forces departments to review policies and provide evidence or proof that the policies are being followed. Critics of CALEA will say that showing proof of one instance of policy compliance is anecdotal and that may be correct, but if done right, the chief champion CALEA and high standards it strives to achieve. CALEA is not only a signal to the community of professionalism, but also as a mechanism to be in a perpetual cycle of reviewing policies and practices to make policies better. During litigation, policies can play a critical

role. Departments are better prepared for litigation when they regularly review policies and can say that their policies are reviewed annually by an outside organization. Once again, the process that CALEA mandates are just as important as the actual accreditation. These organizations play a key role in advancing professionalism in policing.

The second recommendation is for the public to demand higher standards. All the points raised here are things the community should be asking the executives at their local departments. The evidence from the interviews of the chiefs is that consistent questions from the community or groups advocating from the community can be the impetus for change. The right questions from the community can uncover deficiencies of policies and practices. In many cases, policies of departments may go unquestioned for years until a remarkable event. Many departments may not actively seek to improve policies because they are unaware of the vulnerabilities of their policies. It is the case of not having enough knowledge on difficult topics to be aware of the known vulnerabilities. For example, many smaller departments lack expertise in human resources events though police departments typically spend over 80 percent of their budgets on personnel. Without sufficient knowledge of human resources, departments are operating in a field of legal land mines. The public should ask hard questions to test the knowledge of departments and expose organizational weaknesses.

Citizens and community groups should leverage the media if the questions go unanswered. The media is effective in spotlighting acute problems and long-standing problems. Once an issue is circulated in the media, it is much more likely to gain attention from policy makers at the local, state, or national level. Recall that this is exactly what occurred with the death of Michael Brown. It was one of the first events in the United States where social media played a critical role in spreading the story across the world. An explosion of media coverage occurred within just days of the event. The predicament faced by many community members is that without formal power behind their cause, any issues they raise may go nowhere. For better or for worse, the media can bring attention to an issue which brings resources. The advice of the community asking hard questions is certainly not groundbreaking. Some would suggest that many groups have been doing this for years with no results. Regardless of past results, the community should continue to apply coercive pressure in a way that leads to results.

Community members should consider leveraging the knowledge from professional organizations. For the national professional organizations, most of their publications are open source and accessible to anyone. Based on the regression model and the interviews, these organizations are very influential and community members could base their arguments for change in the policy positions of the national professional organizations. Using this tactic may

provide more legitimacy to the community's arguments and bridge the knowledge gap in subject matter expertise.

My final recommendation originates from the very core of the institutional theory dimensions. My recommendation is to strengthen the institutions. Institutional theory is primarily concerned about influence and where it originates. The mimetic dimension of the theory holds that organizations look to each other for new ideas and solutions to new and novel problems. One organization finds a new solution that appears to work and another one adopts it because there is no clear precedent on how to proceed. The normative dimension of the theory states that organizations look to accepted practices in a field to do things. Professional organizations play a key role in this dimension because they provide information and direction for the norms. They also help identify and promote leading organizations in the field. This research has discussed at length the way in which different professional organizations and accreditation bodies can influence the policies and practices of departments.

The recommendation is for the local departments to form working groups to systematically mimic and standardize their operations. Rather than using the natural tendencies of departments to cooperate, the process could be formalized and include larger departments such as St. Louis County Police Department. Currently, many of the municipal departments work very well with others on projects, and this recommendation looks to expand upon that. For example, several departments worked together to research and purchase body

cameras. Similar practices should be expanded to other areas of administrative areas and operations. None of this is to say that departments should or should not consolidate. The issue of consolidating local governments or police departments is beyond the scope of this research. These local departments can keep their independence while working to together to share resources.

The first area where these efforts can be expanded is crime statistics and tracking. Currently there is little day-to-day or week-to-week tracking of crime trends and patterns between departments. The lack of macro level crime tracking at the county level may be surprising, but the fragmented nature of St. Louis County has historically made this difficult. Individual departments track crime and crime statistics, and individual detectives work together for cases that span over many jurisdictions. I am proposing that the departments in St. Louis County work together to hold bi-weekly or monthly meetings discussing crime trends and coordinated responses. The practical benefit of this recommendation is that the situational awareness of crime trends in the county and region should increase substantially. The second benefit is that a stronger coordination of effort should result from the meetings. With more knowledge of crime trends, the limited resources of the collective group of departments can be leveraged to a greater extent. With more collective knowledge, the leaders of the respective departments can mobilize working groups of detectives and officers from different departments to working on the most pressing problems. The nature of these meetings and groups should foster the transfer of

techniques and processes while also improving the service to citizens. The recommended approach is a step toward the integration of services while maintaining the independence of all departments. Participation in the meetings and resulting actions should be completely voluntary.

A second area where departments can collaborate to intentionally foster the spreading of norms and methods of operations is in policy formation.

SLAPCA and CALEA currently play a role in the policy creation process within St. Louis County. SLAPCA makes recommendations to the members and fosters conversations about policies. In contrast, CALEA is making recommendation to accredited departments on the policies to maintain accreditation. One recommendation would be to have departments participate in a voluntary working group to create policies for the entire county. The core tenants of policies would be formed during the working groups. Those tenants or pillars of the policies would be based on research and best practices. Once those core tenants are agreed upon, the finer details and application of the policy can be tailored to each individual department. The essence of the policy would be the same for each department with only the logistics of each policy differing by department. Forming policies in this manner would move the departments toward standardization and unification of policies without compromising the individual identities of departments. Rather than each department work independently to create policies, they can rely on another

department to work exclusively on one policy area and then share results. In other words, the ability to perform deep research on each topic area increases.

Policies are not effective unless officers understand and follow them. To provide this support for policies, I am recommending that St. Louis County Departments voluntarily collaborate on training. The State of Missouri Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) Commission mandates the training required for officers throughout the state. The mandates include requirements for new officers and the continuing education of officers. CALEA mandates training annually, bi-annually, and tri-annually in several areas for departments to maintain accreditation. The implication is that the bulk of the training is already standardized in some way through the state of CALEA if the department is accredited. Some of these areas overlap so that training to satisfy one mandate satisfies another. Within these mandates, room for customization is available to departments. For example, CALEA mandates annual use of force training. The precise content of the training is discretionary. The open-ended nature allows each department to decide what is most important for their needs.

If St. Louis County Departments already share key mandates from the State of Missouri and CALEA and then start sharing core policies, it would follow that they could benefit from sharing continuing education training. The St. Louis County Police Department produces in-service training programs throughout the year to satisfy these requirements for its officers. As long as the officers attend the training, they will meet all state requirements to maintain their

individual POST commission and allow their department to maintain CALEA accreditation. The same in-service training could be provided to the municipal departments of St. Louis County. Once again, this would standardize practices across departments while leveraging the expertise and resources of larger departments. Smaller department may benefit the most from the recommendation. For example, rather than doing the training in-house, very small departments could enroll officers in the St. Louis County training to satisfy annual training requirements.

The final way departments could standardize the norms of police departments is to hold quarterly meetings with community stakeholders to hear direct feedback. For example, every quarter, the chiefs from all St. Louis County Police Departments could meet with the representatives from the area community groups such as the NAACP, ADL, Urban League, and similar groups to discuss current issues. During these meetings, the participants could discuss issues arising from events in the community or review policies with feedback from the community groups. The meetings could even be used as a way to solicit community feedback for policy formation. Back to the theme of formalizing the mechanisms of institutional theory, these meetings bring together the practitioners and community groups so that the line of influence is direct. The chief can hear the perspectives of the community groups directly and on a regular basis. The byproduct of these meetings would be greater recognition of issues from both sides and relationship building.

All of the initiatives discussed within this section rely on voluntary participation. Undoubtably, some departments will not participate. While not desirable, the lack of participation can serve as a key indicator to other departments, elected officials, and community groups as to the professionalism of departments. The benefit to participating in these working groups as I have described them is great with little downside other than putting in the work to implement and execute the policies. The benefits may be greatest to the smallest departments where the resources to research crime stats and policies is the least. Smaller departments could take advantage of the larger departments with virtually no cost.

Limitations of Study

The research has several limitations. Those limitations include the lack of survey participation, lack of generalizability, and the self-selection bias of chiefs. I will explain the implications of each one in turn.

Nearly half of all departments within St. Louis County did not respond to the survey. The survey was promoted for several months with several emails being sent through the SLAPCA member list and with me personally sending emails and calling police departments asking for participation in the survey. The non-responses create a knowledge gap and poses the question of whether those departments are systematically different from those responding to the survey. I examined that question and did find evidence that the non-responding departments are different in terms of size, median income, and accreditation

status. The lack of participants also impacts the confidence in the regression coefficients used in the research. While some were statically significant, the analyses would have had more statistical power to identify effects with greater participation.

An outgrowth of low participation is the generalizability of the findings. The small sample limits the extent of the generalizability of the findings. I would caution applying the findings to other scenarios or departments. Policing in St. Louis County is unique in many ways. Because of the distinctiveness, it becomes harder to apply the findings to departments in other localities with a more unified picture of policing. A key factor when discussing the policing landscape in St. Louis County is the coordination and relationship between departments. I would describe the policing in St. Louis County as an ecosystem where the interconnected organisms are the departments operating in the local political environment. Look no further than the death of Michael Brown as an example of how one organism can disrupt the entire ecosystem. Departments in a more unified and centralized ecosystem of policing do not face some of the same challenges and therefore the findings from this research may not be applicable.

The final limitation of this study concerns the interviews of police chiefs. The chiefs self-selected to be interviewed while completing the survey. They are certainly outliers in the sense that they were willing to complete the survey and willing to be interviewed. Because of these factors, I cannot state they

were an average chief in St. Louis County. In fact, they may be quite different from their peers in their willingness to share their views. Even if they stand apart from their peers, their perspectives provided much needed context to the survey results and offered a view into the mindset of chiefs as they navigate changes to the environment. The insights provided by those chiefs should serve as positive examples as to what challenges are endured by those professionals. The intent was to get the details about the decision-making process and how pressures from the external environment shape the choices made. Even if the chiefs interviewed are outliers, their interviews served the purpose peering into the mechanics of decision making from the top of a police organization.

I turn now to recommendations for further research. To start with, more research needs to be done regarding the impact of outside influences on police reform. This research only looked at one geographic location and did not examine many of the real-world outcomes for the community such as quality of life and perceptions of police. Further research could enhance the literature by looking deeper into the relationship between a chief's reception to outside influence and the outcomes for the community. Perhaps premature, but the speculation would be that chiefs open to outside influence from community groups may lead to greater citizen satisfaction. The chiefs more open to outside influence may represent the community's desires more in political sense. A chief being too political and serving a small breadth of interests could

also lead to dissatisfaction for a police department. A balance of interests with a strong professional base to mediate the opposing poles is likely the best approach.

Another item for further research is examining more closely the role of professional organizations and accreditation programs such as CALEA. Do these programs make a difference? More specifically, do they make a difference in the eyes of the community, the union leaders, or the front-line officers? All of these variables may be inter-related as satisfying one group may cause some dissatisfaction among another group. More research should be done on the role accreditation and standing in the community to see how it impacts the satisfaction with police departments and even officers.

Conclusion

Michael Brown died on August 9, 2014. His death ushered in awareness to long-standing issues that directly or in-directly influenced changes to policies, behaviors, and outcomes. Despite the improvements, more work is required to strengthen policing in St. Louis County. The area needs a greater reliance and use of professional organizations to bring best practices and modern philosophies to St. Louis County policing.

Appendix A: Complete Survey as displayed in Qualtrics

Police Practices in St. Louis County

Start of Block: Intro

Q1.1 The survey you are about to take is to examine policing practices in St. Louis County. The research will involve historical research on policing practices, surveys, and interviews of police officials. The goal of the research is to determine what factors facilitate or inhibit enacting reform measures in police departments in St. Louis County. Participation in this research is voluntary and the risk to the participants is extremely low. Please read the following statements about the research and click the proceed button to consent to all of the conditions and take the survey.

1. You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Ph.D. Candidate, Colby Dolly and Dr. David Kimball.
2. Your participation will involve completing an online survey about your department and a possible follow-up interview by the principal researcher, Colby Dolly. Approximately 50 police departments may be involved in this research. The amount of time involved will be 20 minutes to complete the survey and 40 minutes for the interview (if applicable). The surveys will be completed first to be followed by optional and voluntary interviews at a later date. The interviews will be held virtually for convenience and safety. Participants will not be compensated for participating.
3. You will be asked to identify your police department but not your personal identifying information.
4. There are no known risks associated with this research other than the potential loss of confidentiality. Any discussion of your department in the dissertation or other publication will use a pseudonym to protect the identity of your department.
5. Benefits may include learning what other departments are doing for reform efforts.
6. Your participation is voluntary, and you may choose not to participate in this research study or withdraw your consent at any time. You will NOT be penalized in any way should you choose not to participate or withdraw.
7. We will do everything we can to protect your privacy. As part of this effort, your personal identity will not be revealed in any publication that may result from this study.
8. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, or if any problems arise, you may call the Investigator, Colby Dolly at 314-309-5171 or email him at colbydol@gmail.com. You may also ask questions or state concerns regarding your rights as a research participant to the Office of Research, at 314-516-5897.

☐ Proceed (4)

Skip To: Q1.2 If The survey you are about to take is to examine policing practices in St. Louis County. The res... = Proceed

Q1.2 Department Name:

Page Break

Q88 The next several sections will ask questions about technology, programs, and policies that your department has implemented and the year of implementation.

Q1.3 Technology

Q1.4 Does your department have a body camera program?

- ☐ Yes (1)
 - ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
 - ☐ No (3)
-

Display This Question:

Does your department have a body camera program? = Yes

Q1.5 In what year was the body camera program implemented?

- ☐ 2020 (6)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.6 Does your department use social media for community engagement?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department use social media for community engagement? = Yes

Q1.7 In what year did your department begin to use social media for community engagement?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.8 Does your department post policies and procedures online?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department post policies and procedures online? = Yes

Q1.9 In what year did your department start posting policies and procedures online?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.10 Does your department post crime statistics online?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department post crime statistics online? = Yes

Q1.11 In what year did your department start posting crime statistics online?

☐ 2020 (1)

☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)

☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.12 Does your department publish statistics online about use of force incidents?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department publish statistics online about use of force incidents?
= Yes

Q1.13 In what year did your department start publishing statistics about use of force online?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.14 Training

Q1.15 Is your department mandating procedural justice training for officers ?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Is your department mandating procedural justice training for officers ? = Yes

Q1.16 In what year did your department start mandating procedural justice training for officers?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.17 Is your department mandating de-escalation training for officers (Does not include the mandate by the State of Missouri from October 2020)?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Is your department mandating de-escalation training for officers (Does not include the mandate by... = Yes

Q1.18 In what year was the de-escalation training mandated?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.19 Does your department mandate wellness training for officers?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department mandate wellness training for officers? = Yes

Q1.20 In what year did your department start mandating wellness training for officers?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.21 **Programs**

Page Break

Q1.24 Does your department have a program focused on officer-youth interaction within the community other than D.A.R.E. and S.R.O.s?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department have a program focused on officer-youth interaction within the community oth... = Yes

Q1.25 In what year did your department start the officer-youth programming?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.26 Does your department have an officer wellness program (a program for ensuring the mental, emotional, and physical health of employees) with at least one dedicated employee to run the program ?

- ☐ Yes (1)
 - ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
 - ☐ No (3)
-

Display This Question:

Does your department have an officer wellness program (a program for ensuring the mental, emotion... = Yes

Q1.27 In what year was the officer wellness program started?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.28 Does your department have programs to provide alternatives to arrest or other diversion programs (e.g., C.I.T)?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning in implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department have programs to provide alternatives to arrest or other diversion programs... = Yes

Q1.29 In what year did your department begin to provide alternatives to arrest?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.30 Policies

Q1.31 Does your department have search and seizure procedures related to L.G.B.T.Q. and transgender citizens?

- ☐ Yes (1)
 - ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
 - ☐ No (3)
-

Display This Question:

Does your department have search and seizure procedures related to L.G.B.T.Q. and transgender cit... = Yes

Q1.32 In what year were the search and seizure procedures enacted?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
 - ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
 - ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)
-

Page Break

Q1.33 Does your department have a citizen advisory board for input on policies and oversight? For example, a board specifically to advise on community relations, but not for oversight of complaints.

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department have a citizen advisory board for input on policies and oversight? For examp... = Yes

Q1.34 In what year was the citizen oversight board created?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.35 Does your department have a civilian review board? For example, a board that is responsible for reviewing complaints on officers and the discipline of department employees.

- ☐ Yes (1)
 - ☐ Planning in implementing (2)
 - ☐ No (3)
-

Display This Question:

Does your department have a civilian review board? For example, a board that is responsible for r... = Yes

Q1.36 In what year was the civilian review board established?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.37 Does your department have policies, procedures, or formal plan to recruit more applicants that are representative of the community in terms of race, ethnicity, or gender?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department have policies, procedures, or formal plan to recruit more applicants that ar... = Yes

Q1.38 In what year did your department begin to have policies to recruit more applicants that are representative of the community?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Q1.39 Does your department participate in a national database tracking use of force (e.g., F.B.I., Center for Policing Equity)?

- ☐ Yes (1)
 - ☐ Planning in implementing (2)
 - ☐ No (3)
-

Display This Question:

Does your department participate in a national database tracking use of force (e.g., F.B.I., Cent... = Yes

Q1.40 In what year did your department start to participate in a national database?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
 - ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
 - ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)
-

Q1.41 Does your department report a display of a firearm as a use of force?

- ☐ Yes (1)
 - ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
 - ☐ No (3)
-

Display This Question:

Does your department report a display of a firearm as a use of force? = Yes

Q1.42 In what year did your department start reporting a display of a firearm as a use of force?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.43 Does your department collect data on pedestrian stops other than regular call for service information? For example, collecting the perceived race and age of a citizen and whether a search was conducted.

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department collect data on pedestrian stops other than regular call for service informa... = Yes

Q1.44 In what year did your department start collecting data on pedestrian stops?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Q1.45 Does your department have an early warning system to detect patterns of misconduct or problematic behavior in officers?

- ☐ Yes (1)
 - ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
 - ☐ No (3)
-

Display This Question:

Does your department have an early warning system to detect patterns of misconduct or problematic... = Yes

Q1.46 In what year did your department start using an early warning system?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
 - ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
 - ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)
-

Q1.47 Does your department require written waivers for all consent searches?

- ☐ Yes (1)
 - ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
 - ☐ No (3)
-

Display This Question:

Does your department require written waivers for all consent searches? = Yes

Q1.48 In what year did your department start to require written waivers for all consent searches?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

Page Break

Q1.49 Does your department prohibit the use of misdemeanor wanteds (e.g., entering an arrest teletype based on only an officer's authority)?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ Planning on implementing (2)
- ☐ No (3)

Display This Question:

Does your department prohibit the use of misdemeanor wanteds (e.g., entering an arrest teletype b... = Yes

Q1.50 In what year did your department start prohibiting misdemeanor wanteds?

- ☐ 2020 (1)
- ☐ 2014 to 2019 (7)
- ☐ 2013 or earlier (8)

End of Block: Intro

Start of Block: Influences

Q89 The next section of the survey will ask you to evaluate a series of statements regarding your police department and other groups and organizations.

Q2.1 My department looks to other nearby police departments for best practices.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
 - ☐ Disagree (2)
 - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
 - ☐ Agree (4)
 - ☐ Strongly agree (5)
-

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department looks to other nearby police departments for best practices."



Q2.2 My department looks to other organizations (businesses, schools, non-profits) for best practices.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department looks to other organizations (businesses, schools, non-profits) for best practices."



Q2.3 My department has specific organizations to use for best practices (e.g., specific police departments used to guide policies and operations).

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department has specific organizations to use for best practices (e.g., specific police departments used to guide policies and operations)."



Q2.4 My department encourages attendance at local professional association meetings (S.L.A.P.C.A., F.B.I. NA, etc.).

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department encourages attendance at local professional association meetings (S.L.A.P.C.A., F.B.I. NA, etc.). "



Q2.5 My department encourages employees to obtain leadership roles within the local professional associations.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Page Break

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department encourages employees to obtain leadership roles within the local professional associations."



Q2.6 My department is influenced by the Commission on the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA).

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by the Commission on the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA)."



Q2.7 My department is influenced by the Missouri Police Chiefs' Association.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by the Missouri Police Chiefs' Association."



Q2.8 My department sends employees to the Senior Management Institute of Policing (S.M.I.P.) training.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department sends employees to the Senior Management Institute of Policing (S.M.I.P.) training."



Q2.9 My department sends employees to the F.B.I. National Academy training.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department sends employees to the F.B.I. National Academy training."



Q2.10 My department sends employees to the Northwestern Police Command School.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Page Break

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department sends employees to the Northwestern Police Command School."



Q2.11 My department is influenced by the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Professionals (NOBLE).

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
 - ☐ Disagree (2)
 - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
 - ☐ Agree (4)
 - ☐ Strongly agree (5)
-

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Professionals (NOBLE)."



Q2.12 My department is influenced by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
 - ☐ Disagree (2)
 - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
 - ☐ Agree (4)
 - ☐ Strongly agree (5)
-

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)."



Q2.13 My department regularly applies for grants from external sources.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department regularly applies for grants from external sources."



Q2.14 My department is influenced by local elected officials to enact police reform.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by local elected officials to enact police reform."



Q2.15 My department is influenced by local community groups such as churches, schools, and non-profit organizations to enact police reform.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Page Break

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by local community groups such as churches, schools, and non-profit organizations to enact police reform. "



Q2.16 My department is influenced by local businesses to enact police reform.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by local businesses to enact police reform."



Q2.17 My department is influenced by state or national elected officials to enact police reform.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
 - ☐ Disagree (2)
 - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
 - ☐ Agree (4)
 - ☐ Strongly agree (5)
-

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by state or national elected officials to enact police reform."



Q2.18 My department is influenced by local elected officials/city officials to enforce traffic laws.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
 - ☐ Disagree (2)
 - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
 - ☐ Agree (4)
 - ☐ Strongly agree (5)
-

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by local elected officials/city officials to enforce traffic laws."



Q2.19 My department is influenced by one or more labor organizations to strengthen officer rights and discretion.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
 - ☐ Disagree (2)
 - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
 - ☐ Agree (4)
 - ☐ Strongly agree (5)
-

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by one or more labor organizations to strengthen officer rights and discretion. "



Q2.20 My department is influenced by officers to promote pro-enforcement practices.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
 - ☐ Disagree (2)
 - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
 - ☐ Agree (4)
 - ☐ Strongly agree (5)
-

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is influenced by officers to promote pro-enforcement practices."



Q2.21 Officers in my department are influenced a labor organization.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

End of Block: Influences

Start of Block: Wrap-up

Q90 The next section of the survey will ask questions related to protests and reform.

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "Officers in my department are influenced a labor organization."



Q3.1 A great deal of police reform is needed in St. Louis County.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ☐ Agree (4)
- ☐ Strongly agree (5)

Q3.2 What, if any, specific reforms are needed for policing in St. Louis County?

Q3.3 Do you believe that the protests have been effective in stimulating reform?


Q3.4 What do you feel are the biggest impediments to reform?

Q3.5 Are you willing to be interviewed about your responses and the topic of police reform? Your answers will be confidential. If yes, please provide your contact information.

End of Block: Wrap-up

Appendix B: Regression Diagnostics


Plots of GVLMA checks



Testing for Linearity


To test for linearity, I created a series of scatter plots that showed the relationship between the variables. No obvious pattern of non-linearity existed.

Component + Residual Plots



Testing for Normality

To test for normality, I created a histogram of the residuals and examined the shape of the distribution. The distribution appears to be normal.



Testing for Influential Observations

Testing for influential observations was done with the Bonferroni test. The results of the test found no studentized residuals with a p-value less than 0.05 meaning that there were no influential observations.

Testing for Homoscedasticity

To test for homoscedasticity, I ran the non-constant error variance test and the Breusch-Pagan test. The result of the non-constant error variance test was not significantly significant (p-value = 0.13) meaning that the model meets the assumption of homoscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test provided the same non-significant result (p-value = 0.11) indicating homoscedasticity.

Testing for Multicollinearity

Testing for multicollinearity was done using the variance inflation factor test. The convention is that if a value for a predictor exceeds five, a collinearity problem may exist. The values for each independent and control variable are shown below.

Normative	Mimetic	Coercive	Violent Crime Rate	Total Officers	Median Income
1.43	1.69	1.54	2.42	1.16	3.28

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